UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
--------------------------X

FELD ENTERTAINMENT, INC.
Docket No. 07-1532 Plaintiff, V. Washington, D.C.
October 31, 2012
12:35 p.m.
AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO
ANIMALS, ET AL,
Defendants.
---------------------------X

MOTION HEARING
BEFORE THE HONORABLE EMMET G. SULLIVAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff: FULBRIGHT \& JAWORSKI, L.L.P.
By: John M. Simpson, Esquire
Kara L. Petteway, Esquire Michelle Pardo, Esquire Rebecca Bazan, Esquire
801 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Suite 500
Washington, D.C. 20004
202.662.0200
jsimpson@fulbright. com
kpetteway@fulbright.com
mpardo@fulbright.com
rbasan@fulbright. com

For the Defendants:
WILDLIFE ADVOCACY LAW OFFICE OF STEPHEN L. BRAGA, PLLC
PROJECT; TOM RIDER By: Stephen L. Braga, Esquire
3070 Woods Cove Lane
Woodbridge, VA 22192
617.304 .7124
bragalaw@gmail.com

FUND FOR ANIMALS ZUCKERMAN SPAEDER, LLP
By: Roger E. Zuckerman, Esquire Logan D. Smith, Esquire
1800 M Street, N.W., Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20036
202.778.1800
rzuckerman@zuckerman.com
lsmith@zuckerman.com

APPEARANCES: (CONT'D.)

For the Defendants:

MEYER, GLITZENSTEIN
\& CRYSTAL;
KATHERINE MEYER;
ERIC GLITZENSTEIN;
HOWARD CRYSTAL

JON LOVVORN and
KIM OCKENE

HUMANE SOCIETY OF
THE UNITED STATES

AMERICAN SOCIETY
FOR THE PREVENTION
OF CRUELTY TO
ANIMALS

BORN FREE

MORGAN, LEWIS \& BOCKIUS, LLP By: W. Brad Nes, Esquire 1111 Pennslvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004 202.739.5779 bnes@morganlewis.com

PATTERSON BELKNAP WEBB \& TYLER, LLP By: Peter W. Tomlinson, Esquire 1133 Avenue of the Americas New York, N.Y. 10036 212.336. 2000
pwtomlinson@pbwt. com

SCHERTLER \& ONORATO, LLP
By: David H. Dickieson, Esquire 575 7th Street, N.W. Suite 300 South Washington, D.C. 20004
202.628.4199
ddickieson@schertlerlaw.com

APPEARANCES: (CONT'D.)
For the Defendants:
ANIMAL WELFARE DiMURO GINSBERG, P.C.
INSTITUTE By: Hillary J. Collyer, Esquire
1101 King Street, Suite 610
Alexandria,VA 22314
703.684 .4333
hcollyer@dimuro.com
Court Reporter: Catalina Kerr, RPR U.S. District Courthouse Room 6509
Washington, D.C. 20001 202.354.3258

Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, transcript produced by computer.

$$
\mathrm{P}-\mathrm{R}-\mathrm{O}-\mathrm{C}-\mathrm{E}-\mathrm{E}-\mathrm{D}-\mathrm{I}-\mathrm{N}-\mathrm{G}-\mathrm{S}
$$

(12:35 P.M.; OPEN COURT.)

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Please remain seated and come to order. Civil Action 07-1532, Feld Entertainment, Inc. versus American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, et al. Would counsel please identify yourselves for the record.

MR. SIMPSON: Good morning, Your Honor. John

Simpson for the Plaintiff. And with me today is Michelle Pardo, Kara Petteway, Rebecca Bazan.

THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon. Sorry. Let me just first apologize to everybody. I'm sorry. I had to -we had to make some minor adjustments because we anticipated public transportation would be not as great as it always is, if it always is great, and then $I$ had a sealed matter that took way too long, but I had to resolve. Sorry. I apologize for keeping you waiting. It was just unavoidable. Sorry. Good afternoon.

MR. ZUCKERMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. I'm Roger Zuckerman for the Fund for Animals, and with me is my partner Logan Smith.

THE COURT: All right. Counsel.

MR. BRAGA: Good morning, Your Honor. Stephen Braga for Defendant Wildlife Advocacy Project.

MS. STEEL: And good afternoon, Your Honor. I'm Laura Steel. I'm here on behalf of Meyer, Glitzenstein \&

Crystal, Katherine Meyer, Eric Glitzenstein and Howard Crystal.

THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon, Counsel.

MR. WEISSMAN: Your Honor, I'm Andrew Weissman from Wilmer Hale on behalf Jon Lovvorn and Kim Ockene, and here with me is Mr. Scott Litvinoff.

THE COURT: All right. Counsel, good afternoon to you.

MR. NES: Brad Nes, Your Honor, here from Morgan

Lewis, here for the Humane Society of the United States.

MR. TOMLINSON: Peter Tomlinson from Patterson

Belknap on behalf of ASPCA.

THE COURT: All right, Counsel. Good afternoon.

MR. DICKIESON: David Dickieson from Schertler \&

Onorato on behalf of Born Free, U.S.A.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. COLLYER: Hillary Collyer from DiMuro Ginsberg
on behalf of Animal Welfare Institute.

THE COURT: All right. I guess one of the benefits,
if there was any benefit at all, because of the shutdown of the City was that I had even more time to consider your competing arguments and $I$ used that time to do so.

The Court has spent a great deal of time on these
issues. First, leading up to the issuance of the Court's opinion in July and since then. I have a few questions to ask
both sides. I recognize there are multiple attorneys representing various Defendants, and I leave it to them as to who's going to respond to the question, but $I$ don't need six answers to one question.

So -- but I do have some questions that I need answers to, and you know, I thoroughly understand your arguments and -- but $I$ need some answers. So, let me first -and that's going to be difficult because you don't know my questions -- invite the attorney to respond to the unknown questions to the podium for the Defendants.

Are you speaking for the group? Oh, you both speak for the group.

MR. ZUCKERMAN: My task this morning is to both thank Your Honor for taking time in what is now the lunch hour to hear us.

THE COURT: Yeah, I'm sorry. I really -- I really, you know, my heart goes -- you know, I was a trial lawyer. I know what this does to your schedules, and I'm sorry. I really am.

MR. ZUCKERMAN: We very much appreciate it. To assure Your Honor that we are prepared to be smooth and brief and to introduce Steve Braga who will, I think, speak on behalf of all of the Defendants.

THE COURT: All right. That's great.

MR. ZUCKERMAN: I know he will very capably respond
to Your Honor's questions.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Zuckerman, I appreciate that.

MR. BRAGA: Your Honor, I've been chosen. It feels like maybe a halloween trick, but here I am.

THE COURT: All right. Well, it's a treat for the Court to have you here. It's a treat for the Court to have all of you here.

MR. BRAGA: I'll be happy to answer your questions.
THE COURT: I'm sorry I don't have any candy to pass out, but I'll be mild with the questions.

The Defendants ask for reconsideration of the decision that Feld has adequately alleged a pattern. Looking at the allegations referencing the 2005 fundraiser, that's paragraphs 179 to 183 of the First Amended Complaint, I want you to explain the pleading deficiencies. That's what we're talking about here in view of Twombly and Iqbal, the pleading deficiencies in alleging donor fraud.

It seems to me, and I thought I made it clear in the opinion, that those paragraphs survive Twombly, Iqbal, as well as the heightened pleading requirements for fraud under Rule $9(b)$ because they allege who, what, when, where, and how. But if somehow or another they are still insufficient, you need to tell me with clarity why they aren't adequate.

MR. BRAGA: Yes, Your Honor. I'm happy to do so.

There is two ways in which those paragraphs, these allegations are critical to our request with respect to the pattern ruling. The first is, after detailed argument and addressing a lot of attention to this issue at the argument, as Your Honor did, Your Honor recognized under Western and Edmondson it's virtually impossible to allege a single scheme, single victim, single injury, few victims to make a pattern. You also recognized that this case overwhelmingly was about a single scheme, the ESA action, and then you scrutinized the Amended Complaint for other allegations that might find another scheme, other victims, other injuries, just the way you should have. You focused on those July 2000 fundraising allegations.

First issue is, do those allegations raise a second scheme? In those paragraphs, Your Honor referenced 179 through 183, FEI alleges that the fundraising activity in those paragraphs either was done to defraud FEI of money and property and/or to unjustly enrich the Defendants. So, it could be both schemes, could be one scheme, could be the other.

In fact, the way the rest of the complaint fits together, and under Iqbal and Twombly, they got to plausibly fit together, those allegations can't be a second scheme. Why not? Because the second scheme alleged to unjustly enrich the Defendants, through donations based on false and misleading
materials, doesn't apply to this fundraiser.
The other allegations of this complaint make very clear that this money was going to Tom Rider. Your Honor has a finding of fact in your seminal decision in this case, Finding of Fact 39, the money raised by AWI went to WAP, went to Tom Rider. The complaint has allegations, paragraphs 179, this fundraiser was to raise money as an additional source of funding for Rider. Paragraph 180, the funds were being raised to provide Rider with a livelihood. So this money was not going to enrich any of the Defendants, so it can't be that it was part of the second alleged scheme and/or to unjustly enrich the Defendants. It went to Rider. It didn't unjustly enrich anyone.

The more plausible way to look at that second scheme allegation is that that was added to the complaint by FEI as part of its request for a disgorgement remedy. Remember, Your Honor, that in the amended complaint they asked all of the organizations to disgorge all of their ill-gotten gains, not realizing, apparently, that after the Philip Morris case, disgorgement is not an available remedy under RICO.

So, No. 1, those fundraising paragraphs that Your Honor directed me to can't allege a second scheme. They go back to the scheme to defraud FEI.

And further proof of that, Your Honor, go back and look at the original complaint. The original complaint in
this case, paragraphs 122 to 126 of the original complaint make the exact same July 2005 fundraiser allegations. Right before those paragraphs is a big bold typeset heading in the original complaint. The fund -- it says, The Fundraiser Held in Furtherance of this Scheme to Defraud CEI [sic] of Money and Property.

So, at the original complaint, there was just one scheme. At the amended complaint, they're trying to make it into two schemes. It doesn't work for the reasons I've just described, and as the D.C. Circuit recognized in Western, you can go back and look at the original complaint to try to figure out what is really plausibly being alleged. So, those fundraiser allegations don't raise a second scheme.

Your Honor still could find a distinction from Western and Edmondson if those fundraiser allegations provided additional victims, additional injuries, and there's references to that in Your Honor's opinion.

Our problem with the sufficiency of these pleadings, these paragraphs, for those purposes, are --

THE COURT: You raise a good point because that dovetails into the second question I had, is would Feld -let's you said that Feld could not allege multiple victims, all right. So, would Feld still have a pattern under Western Associates and Edmondson under the six factor test established by those cases? In particular, the factors of, one, the
number of acts alleged; two, the length of time over which the acts were committed; three, the number of perpetrators; four, the character of the unlawful activity, and here it seems that Feld has alleged over a thousand racketeering acts committed over many years by several perpetrators and of varying character consisting of allegations of fraud, bribery, obstruction of justice, illegal witness payments. So why isn't that enough?

MR. BRAGA: Your Honor, going into that six factor test, which Your Honor indicated in your July $9^{\text {th }}$ opinion as the second ground for finding pattern above and beyond the second scheme, which we've talked about, that -- those factors -- let me go through them, Your Honor -- duration, length of the scheme.

Eight years in this case, according to Your Honor's opinion; Western Associates, eight years.

Variety of the unlawful acts. Bribery, illegal gratuities, money laundering looks quite similar to me to the variety of the predicate acts in Edmondson, so you've got that carryover.

Number of perpetrators, Your Honor focused on 13 perpetrators identified in this case. In Western, there were actually 15 defendants named in the original complaint. We gave Your Honor a copy of the original complaint and our supplemental authorities to the motion to dismiss. So far
length looks the same as Western.

Variety of predicate acts looks the same as

Edmondson. Number of perpetrators, Western is actually more. And what Your Honor really focused on and what Mr. Simpson hammered on at his argument was the number of predicate acts. You said over a thousand in your opinion, and the argument on the motion to dismiss, Mr. Simpson said 1300.

I actually tried to calculate them from the Amended Complaint. I don't know how you can get to a finite number, which is probably why Your Honor said over a thousand, but when you look at Edmondson in the six factor test, it doesn't say "number of predicate acts." It says "number of unlawful acts."

And why? Because the courts have been careful to recognize that creative lawyers, and Mr. Simpson is certainly a good hard working creative lawyer, can multiply --

THE COURT: As is everyone else in this courtroom.

MR. BRAGA: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Everyone. I mean, it's my treat.
Really, it is my treat today to be treated by the presence of everyone. Go ahead.

MR. BRAGA: Thank you. So, creative lawyers can multiply a single unlawful act into multiple predicate acts and thereby inflate what looks like a predicate act pattern. That's happened in this case.

When you look at paragraph 77 through 80 of this Amended Complaint, you'll see that a single payment to Mr. Rider does the following. Payment out to Mr. Rider constitutes mail fraud or wire fraud, invoice back to one of the organizations constitute mail fraud or wire fraud, payment out to Mr. Rider constitutes bribery, payment out to Mr. Rider constitutes legal gratuity, payment into Mr. Rider constitutes bribery, payment into Mr. Rider constitutes illegal gratuity, and the payments constitute money laundering, seven times multiplication of the payments.

Now, I will tell Your Honor, in all candor, I have to admit, this case, even if you take away the seven times factor, has more predicate acts than Western, has more predicate acts than Edmondson, has over 200 predicate acts, even by my defense lawyer calculation. When you pay somebody per month for over ten years and pay their expenses, there's a lot of predicate acts, but H.J. says and the cases all say it's not just the number of predicate acts that determines it. It's much more important to look at the nature of the unlawful activity, and that's, I think, where the distinction that Your Honor tried to draw could be refocused on the nature of that activity. That's what Western and Edmondson are trying to get at with a single scheme.

Is the nature of this activity not just a bunch of predicate acts in a single dishonest episode, a defined end
point one case, or is it something that looks more like a pattern? More like Milberg Weiss, hundreds of fraudulent lawsuits? More like something that has the threat, the pattern, the threat of continued harm that RICO is meant to address? It's not just the number of predicate acts. I hope that answered your question.

THE COURT: I may come back to that. Let me move on.

The -- You focus on the causation element as in your motion for reconsideration also and you argue that there has been a change in the controlling law or facts as a basis for the motion as a result of the October 2011 opinion, but -- and this is brought to the court's attention ten months later. I don't understand why. What's the significance of that opinion? I mean, why so late? Why wasn't it an argument made front and center early on if it's such a compelling argument?

MR. BRAGA: I think, Your Honor, out of respect for Your Honor's time and the efficient use of judicial resources, if we had just that argument alone, we probably wouldn't have raised it with a reconsideration. We would have come back to it later at trial. Once we decided that the pattern ruling was so unique and so important and that we were going to ask Your Honor to certify it to the Court of Appeals, we thought, well, then we might as well put in this other issue that gives us concern at the same time.

THE COURT: All right. Going back to "2." Your answer focused on the predicate acts, but also what the Court considered was the number of the sufficiency of the allegations as well, and there's a distinction that can be drawn between predicate acts and sufficiency of the allegation in considering whether they've met their burden of proper pleading.

MR. BRAGA: Sure, sure. Your Honor, with respect
to -- you want me to address the sufficiency of the pleading of the fundraiser allegations?

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. BRAGA: Because those fundraiser allegations, as

I said a minute ago, they either help with the second scheme, we talked about that, or they give Your Honor --

THE COURT: I'm just trying to figure out what's missing here. You know, again, we're at the pleading stage. That's all we are, after all these years, we're at the pleading stage. Maybe it goes further. Maybe it goes upstairs, or maybe not. We'll see.

MR. BRAGA: Well, we're at the pleading stage, but Your Honor, under a different regime than you and I grew up under. It used to be the old Conley versus Gibson standard. THE COURT: Right.

MR. BRAGA: Now we're under Iqbal/Twombly. It's got to be plausible. In fact, plausible is the test now.

THE COURT: And not just possible?

MR. BRAGA: Not just possible. Possible is not good enough. If it's an "if," that's possible. That's not good enough. If it's a "might," equally -- then under Twombly, equally plausible, that's not good enough. You got to nudge it a little bit ahead of --

THE COURT: What's lacking here? Why implausible then?

MR. BRAGA: What's lacking here in paragraphs 179 through 183 in the fundraiser allegations is any allegation that a single third-party victim acted on the misleading solicitation materials.

What we have here -- and it's important that this invitation to this fundraiser, which was submitted as an exhibit to our --

THE COURT: They would have needed what, declarations or so from participants of that saying we gave or would not have given but for, or what's -- what's --

MR. BRAGA: They would have needed to be able to represent in good faith in a pleading signed under Rule 11 that they believed that a victim acted on these false statements.

Now, the reason that's important, Your Honor, is this invitation that went out, they don't allege the entire thing to be false. And so there's a statement they say this
statement's false but they don't say that statement is. The possibility exists, the plausibility exists, the opportunity exists if somebody gave because of that other statement.

And let me give you a good example. From the exhibit, the actual language of the invitation, in the fourth paragraph, text not challenged as false in the Amended Complaint, says, numerous eyewitness accounts and other evidence of the mistreatment of the elephants, including the deaths of several baby elephants, has been collected in the lawsuit. Not challenged as false, that goes out to a potential donor. How do we know that the donor is not giving on the basis of that allegation? Oh, my gosh, the death of baby elephants, I'm going to give $\$ 150$ to these people, versus what Mr. Simpson does complain as false, among other things, that, well, you didn't tell them that the nonprofit organizations had millions of dollars in resources.

There's -- there's an ambiguity there that's not pled. There's not a single victim pled. There's nothing in the complaint about this victim acted on the basis of these false statements.

What the complaint does say, though, Your Honor, and this is telling, I think, in paragraph 182, where one would ordinarily talk about who was going to be deceived by a mail fraud or a wire fraud, paragraph 182 says, this scheme was, quote, reasonably calculated to deceive FEI, the one victim we
already have in the case.

And then if you go to paragraph 183, even more directly, quote, FEI is the direct victim, close quote, of this fundraising scheme. They pled that they're a victim. We know they're a victim. They're a single victim. They're the single victim in this case. They haven't pled any other victims.

Their pleading literally is the poster child for Twombly, Your Honor. It sets forth, they sent out a solicitation, some of the solicitation was false and somebody might have acted on that falsity. "Might" is not good enough.

THE COURT: So, your argument is that it was incumbent under controlling Supreme Court precedent, it was incumbent for the Plaintiffs to allege, in good faith, that the donors indeed gave money as a result of these false representations then?

MR. BRAGA: Yes, that somebody was defrauded. We don't have a victim if nobody was defrauded. And right now we don't have an allegation that's plausible under Twombly that anybody was defrauded other than FEI.

THE COURT: Does the complaint provide enough notice that money was raised as a result of this fundraiser? Does the complaint allege that?

MR. BRAGA: The complaint does allege that money was raised as a result of this fundraising, and as $I$ said a moment
ago --

THE COURT: It's not enough for them to allege that this money or part of this money could have been raised as a result of false representations then. That's not sufficient.

MR. BRAGA: "Could have been" is not enough, Your

Honor. "Could have been" is not enough anymore.

Anything further?

THE COURT: No.

MR. BRAGA: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, I have some other questions.

I'm sorry. Not on that point.

MR. BRAGA: Was trying to get a halloween treat and get out early.

THE COURT: The Circuit's 2011 decision, where in that opinion did the Circuit state that API had standing sufficient to get to trial in the ESA action?

MR. BRAGA: I believe that the decision was cast as a failure of proof, and there was a petition for rehearing filed on that that in the event of a ruling that there was a failure of proof, the case should be remanded back to Your Honor --

THE COURT: Right.
MR. BRAGA: -- for consideration of whether the full record, which wasn't briefed before the Court of Appeals, had such proof.

THE COURT: And it was denied without further opinion, I believe.

MR. BRAGA: It was. It was, Your Honor, yes.
THE COURT: But the Circuit didn't address API's standing, though, did it?

MR. BRAGA: The Circuit did not. The Circuit said that the standing theory articulated on behalf of API, the Havens Realty information theory was a valid standing theory, that it could have been proven that API had standing had the facts supported that theory.

THE COURT: That was speculation on the part of the Circuit, though, was it not?

MR. BRAGA: Not speculation. It's a poignant part of the ruling because --

THE COURT: Did the Circuit say that API had Havens

Realty standing?

MR. BRAGA: No.

THE COURT: Did not.

MR. BRAGA: Did not, because it wasn't proven at trial.

THE COURT: That's exactly right.

MR. BRAGA: The reason it wasn't speculation by the Circuit is Mr. Simpson argued that that standing theory is not even proper. So, A, there's no theory that works that way, and B, they didn't prove it. The circuit court said, no, the
theory's okay, but they didn't prove it. And Your Honor, they did not say API had standing.

THE COURT: Right. Okay. All right. So then what's the value then of the standing argument that you make now? What's the -- what's the precedential value?

MR. BRAGA: The value of it is simply as it relates
to the Hemi Group and the additional progeny, Bridge, and those other cases, Anza, which say that there's got to be a direct injury in RICO cases.

And so, if API could have maintained its standing theory through trial, they would have had to prove it. They didn't prove it factually, but it was a valid theory to come to court on. If API could have been in court on that valid legal theory throughout, then the damages that are claimed, \$20 million for defending the ESA lawsuit because of the Rider fraud, that wouldn't -- they wouldn't be caused necessarily by the Rider fraud because FEI would still be in court on the API theory.

THE COURT: Anza and Holmes don't stand for the proposition, though, that no RICO injury could ever be asserted unless it was solely and completely attributable to the alleged unlawful activity, do they?

MR. BRAGA: No, they don't stand for that proposition. They stand for the sort of the corollary of that that if it's too difficult to figure out which injuries are
attributable to the RICO fraud, then you can't separate it out.

So, the argument here is that in light of the fact that API is lawfully entitled to be in court throughout the history of this case, how do you separate out the Rider stuff? Because the Rider stuff, remember, is not just Rider's standing. It's also Rider evidence about elephant abuse, and even though Your Honor found him not credible --

THE COURT: Which we never got to.

MR. BRAGA: Yeah, never got to that second issue.

And so how would one go about trying to separate out what was attributable to Rider versus what was attributable to API? It seems impossible to me, but it could be possible, and if it was possible, Anza wouldn't preclude that.

THE COURT: With respect to circulation, you know, I don't really have an argument with your claim on the first and third factors necessary for certain certification. One, that the pattern issue is a controlling question of law, it is; and three, that a decision on its viability may materially advance the ultimate determination of litigation. I'm persuaded there.

I question the applicability of the second factor, that there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion. Where is the authority for that in this case? I mean, what should the Court rely on to find that this factor has been
met, as opposed to just a difference of opinion? And everyone on the right side of the courtroom has a difference of opinion about the second factor, but that doesn't carry the day, and I'm not aware of any precedent in which this precise issue has been squarely presented to a circuit court where the Court can look back and say, you know, I'm troubled because there are splits in the country about this issue, but I don't see a substantial ground for difference of opinion other than reasonable people might disagree with that, which is the case in every case we have, because there are two sides and people rarely agree on anything.

MR. BRAGA: Yes, Your Honor. It's an interesting case on this factor. It really, really is because it's not like your prototypical case where you can point to this person's dissenting opinion or the Supreme Court said that. THE COURT: It's atypical; would you not agree? And if you don't agree with that --

MR. BRAGA: I don't know if I'd go that far.
THE COURT: If you don't agree with that, tell me where the other similar cases are or the identical cases that would persuade the Court that, you know, there really is a substantial ground for difference of -- I mean, this is RICO. RICO has been around for decades.

MR. BRAGA: Yeah. Part of --
THE COURT: But if it's not atypical, why isn't it
atypical, this case?

MR. BRAGA: Part of it depends on what Your Honor does with the fundraising allegations we just talked about. THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. BRAGA: If Your Honor agrees with me that there's no second scheme, then we have a ground for difference of opinion because Western and Edmondson say --

THE COURT: If I agree with you there, then there's no basis for certification, then you win on reconsideration, right?

MR. BRAGA: Your Honor, that would be fine.

THE COURT: Right?

MR. BRAGA: We're happy to go that way.

THE COURT: Seriously, though, right?

MR. BRAGA: No, no, absolutely. Absolutely.

THE COURT: And then they'd be asking -- they'd be
rushing downstairs to file something, I'm sure.

MR. BRAGA: Somebody would.

THE COURT: They would be out of court so they could
file as a matter of right, right?

MR. BRAGA: Exactly.

THE COURT: That's a balancing of the scales, I
guess, isn't it?

MR. BRAGA: It might be the best way to get the case up there, Your Honor.

THE COURT: He's got a smile on his face. That's a balancing of the scales, isn't it?

MR. SIMPSON: Sort of, Your Honor.

MR. BRAGA: Now Mr. Simpson is wondering whether it's a trick or a treat.

Your Honor, we have -- so we have Western and Edmondson on the one hand saying single scheme, single injury, few victims, virtually impossible. That's a pretty big standard. We have Your Honor saying overwhelmingly this case, the ESA case where Mr. Simpson is saying -- and believe me, both sides have looked all over the world for these kind of litigation fraud cases, Mr. Simpson says two things. Milberg Weiss, that's not an analogy, that's hundreds of fraudulent lawsuits, that's clearly a pattern. Then he says Eighth Circuit, Handeen versus Lemaire, decided before both Edmondson and Western.

So, there's a little bit of a circuit split there on what it means to be a single scheme. In terms of the why there's a ground of difference of opinion, obviously, in the application of Iqbal and Twombly, they're still relatively new. As Judge Posner says in the In Re Text Messaging Antitrust case, we said it in our papers, there's foment over what one has to plead in the lower federal courts as a result of this. Combining those standards of plausibility with the virtually impossible --

THE COURT: Maybe it's time to go back to Conley v. Gibson, huh?

MR. BRAGA: It'd fine with me, Your Honor. It'd be fine with me. But Your Honor, further, Your Honor has given evidence that there's substantial ground for difference of opinion.

Your Honor said at least four to five times at the motion to dismiss hearing, it's in the transcript, I'm troubled by this pattern issue. This pattern issue bothers me. Exactly the kind of --

THE COURT: I am troubled by everything. You know, really, in every case, because the stakes are so high. And you look at -- pull up all the transcripts, and you know, I don't encourage you to do that. You see how I pulled my gray out, you know, because these cases, the stakes are so high and they are troubling, and you know, we strive to reach the right decision for the right reason, but just the fact that they're troubling, all the GTMO cases, Guantanamo cases, troubling, the predecessor case was troubling for a decade, troubled me and Judge Facciola, and the Circuit labored over it, you know.

I listened to the argument, and you know, I mean, everything is troubling because we all strive to reach the right decision for the right reason, but that's not a basis to send it up, though. They're all difficult cases.

MR. BRAGA: Well, it's Your Honor recognizing that
there is a potential difference of opinion, that, boy, this is troubling. You know, when I clerked for Judge Flannery, some cases were troubling, some weren't. Some were as clear as day. Boy, that's not troubling.

THE COURT: Tom Flannery knew everything. Nothing troubled Tom. He was the quickest around here, you know.

MR. BRAGA: Your Honor, I would cite Your Honor to Judge Huvelle's --

THE COURT: You didn't learn about being troubled when you worked Judge Flannery, though, did you?

MR. BRAGA: I did not, no. It was after I left him.
THE COURT: He was quick, right.
MR. BRAGA: Your Honor, I would cite Your Honor to the APCC case, Services versus Sprint Communications, Judge Huvelle. We cite it in our papers.

THE COURT: That's one of the five cases I took, and she was troubled for the right reasons because there were cases throughout the country on that point, right, and we're talking about, you know, refunds of vast sums of money, and she -- and she maintained her ground. She stood her ground. She said, $I$ don't doubt the correctness of this, but because the stakes are so high and because other courts have taken different positions, she thought it appropriate to do that. Judge Rothstein just this year -- and you start reading that case, it's about speech and debate. So what's
the big deal? I mean, speech and debate was in Ted Stevens. Speech and debate is in all these -- at lot of these cases we get because we get a lot of cases involving things that happen, allegedly happen on Capitol Hill, but those are difficult issues. They're troubling issues. Where does our jurisdiction start? Where is it -- you know, when is it appropriate for senators, congressmen to say things on the floor, and it starts off like why is this case up here, until you read the opinion. Well, of the four opinions, when Judge Kennedy scrutinized the same issue and two judges didn't even weigh in, pretty compelling reason for Judge Rothstein -- I read further -- I said she's absolutely correct to certify it and I believe the Circuit very recently took that case, but you know what, not to minimize this case at all.

This case is about, you know, parties against parties over a rather significant sum of money. That's what this case is about. And again, not minimizing it, but it's -and I hate that word "garden variety." And I never use that word. And it's not a garden variety. It's a complicated case that's going to trouble us and trouble Judge Facciola, maybe, down the line, if the case remains here, but it's troubling and complicated.

But you know what, so all these cases are. But I don't see the factors. I don't see the -- you mentioned disgorgement, the tobacco case. Judge Kessler certified that
issue. She was concerned about the scope of expert examination on direct. She was concerned about disgorgement because the Second Circuit took a view that was different from hers. That was a big case impacting probably the world, whatever she did, and she's still wrestling with it with respect to remedy, but that's another case that cried out for certification.

I don't believe I've certified a case. If I have, you'd probably tell me. I don't recall that I've done that. That's not to say I've not been requested to do that over the years, but by and large, we don't. On occasion, the Circuit has counseled against piecemeal consideration of appeals for cogent reasons. And I'm just troubled. Again, I am troubled. Why -- you know, it's an -- it's a discretionary call. I guess I could articulate reasons why it should, but it's a RICO case involving requests, a demand for significant sums of money because of alleged RICO activity involving private parties, and it doesn't seem to fit, unless I'm missing something, the mold for certification.

MR. BRAGA: Your Honor, it's a little bit off. It's a one off from the typical certification case. In that decision, Judge Huvelle, $I$ just wanted to point out, says, quote, where proceedings that threaten to endure for several years, certainly this case, depend on an initial --

THE COURT: Parties already passed that record,
yeah. We're working on the second chapter.

MR. BRAGA: When those proceedings depend on an
initial question of jurisdiction, exactly what we're talking about here, because if the RICO ruling is reversed, the federal question jurisdiction goes away. Under supplemental pendent jurisdiction doctrine, Your Honor would be fully justified in sending the available remedies to Mr. Simpson to state court.

So, the question is whether this case, which is going to be a massive case, not a huge public impact case, like the ones Your Honor just talked about, but a very important, very significant, very intrusive case.

THE COURT: Very important case to the parties, and they're all important, and they're important as well to the court and to the public. The public has an interest in this case. The public has been following this case intently over the years.

MR. BRAGA: Certainly. And now, in light of the current victim allegations, all the donors to all of these organizations. I mean, are we really going to unleash a case where the donate records from a website of every organization can be looked at to see why they donated; was it chimpanzees or elephants?

And the victim problem really in this case, Your Honor, is perhaps most starkly addressed by the allegation in

Mr. Simpson's reply that HSUS could be a victim. He says in his paper, if HSUS was defrauded by FFA, then HSUS is a victim, a co-victim of these fundraising allegations. Well, "if" doesn't work under Twombly. "If" is a possibility. But if HSUS was defrauded by FFA, then they're going to be a co-victim and go over here even though his complaint is laced with allegations that HSUS did all of this intentional, deceptive, scheming, illegal RICO conduct.

You can't have it both ways. You got to go one way or the other under Twombly. He's trying to have it one way or both ways. HSUS is a RICO defendant and racketeer, but if I need them to be a victim, they can be a victim. If we could do that, Your Honor, then we could say, well, if FFA was defrauded by, and all the other organizations were defrauded by the lawyers, and the lawyers were defrauded by Rider, then all the organizations, all the lawyers move over here with Mr. Simpson as co-victims. Rider is left standing as the guy who lied to everybody. He takes a default judgment, he doesn't have any money, and we're done.

THE COURT: Discovery is the big issue in the case.
I mean, it's -- and forgive me, it's the elephant in the courtroom, you know. It is. It seriously is. And the Court's very sensitive to -- to what's being alleged about what's discoverable. And I don't really think I need to focus on that, what's discoverable down the line to drive the

Court's decision about whether or not it should reach certification, but I mean, it's something the Court's mindful of.

The Court's also mindful of the long line of cases starting with the NAACP I and II and about donor lists and First Amendment, and this is the -- this is the conflict between RICO and -- to a certain extent, RICO and First Amendment privileges.

But that's not to -- so, that's going to be difficult, and it's going to be troubling to sort that out. I think there was a reference into one of the briefs about, well, the Circuit would be in a better position to carve out parameters for discovery. Well, first of all, they aren't going to do that, $I$ don't believe. The circuit court is not going do that on a certification issue. The Circuit Court would, in all elements, speaking for the Circuit, is going to address the issue that it has to address, and if it takes the case, it will decide -- it will decide the sufficiency of the allegations, whether justify RICO or not, but I doubt very seriously whether the Circuit Court would go so far as to say, well, we find the allegation sufficient, and upon remand, the district court is directed to do this, that and the other. I doubt that, but $I$ mean, that's an argument that's made, but I dismiss that because I don't believe the Circuit Court would go down that road.

But again, I mean, you know, we deal with these issues every day, national security issues. We deal -majority of issues this court deals with, as well as my colleagues, are sealed from the public's view. You'd be amazed probably and the public would be amazed about what we do deal with and how -- and the complexity of matters that we deal with, and they're sealed because of compelling reasons, but it doesn't mean that we aren't giving time and attention because they are important issues and they are troubling issues, but we resolve them, and more often than not, we resolve them without resorting to the circuit court.

They are all complicated. I mean, we started -- if that was the standard, complexity, I mean, you know, we would just, I guess, send everything up there to the circuit court, but it's not. And we saw that -- and if the case remains here, there will be significant issues to address.

What are they entitled to? Are they entitled to anything? The First Amendment means a heck of a lot, and we are going to defend that, but that's -- that's a big concern here, but seems to me, that doesn't -- how much weight should the Court give that?

We may -- that's going to come down the pike. We know that. There will be requests, and there have been requests already made for anything and everything associated with donors. But we also recognize, you know, there's a
large -- there are many Supreme Court cases that have defined the parameters of what can be required to be produced and not, and there will probably be some new parameters defined by this court as to what information, if any, the Plaintiffs are entitled to. But again, that's -- that doesn't seem to counsel in favor of a -- of tipping the balance to certification. Should it?

MR. BRAGA: Yes, it should, Your Honor. And I'll
tell you why. Because --
THE COURT: Well, is there any case anywhere that says that, that focus on discovery? I don't know if a case has been cited, and $I$ was interested in that. Tell me where there's a case where some judge has said, you know what, this is going to -- this is a big intersection here, this is going to pit constitutional concerns against statutory, you know, complaints, and I'm going to certify to have the Court address those. I'm not aware of any. Are you?

MR. BRAGA: There's no case, Your Honor, that
addresses discovery specifically in the context you're talking about. What the cases address is, and Your Honor said this in the Judicial Watch case and others, certification is an exceptional case remedy.

THE COURT: It's a task force case. I asked to certify that?

MR. BRAGA: Yes.

THE COURT: I don't recall, and I denied it and it went up anyway. I was affirmed. I was affirmed en banc, and then $I$ don't know what happened after that.

MR. BRAGA: And I must, in all candor, Your Honor asked the one question $I$ was afraid you were going to ask earlier I should come back to, whether you've certified. You haven't. So this is the perfect opportunity to balance the scales. The way that discovery --
(LAUGHTER.)

THE COURT: I knew you would know the answer to
whether I certified. I knew that. Thank you for reminding me that I haven't certified.

MR. BRAGA: The way that discovery comes up, Your

Honor, is --

THE COURT: How did they get to the Circuit anyway?

MR. BRAGA: Mandamus.

THE COURT: That's right. Exactly. Right.

MR. BRAGA: The way the discovery comes in is all the courts recognize, Your Honor, and everyone, and in fact the Judiciary Committee report leading up to $1292(\mathrm{~b})$ recognizes that what we mean by reserving this certification for the exceptional cases is the protracted, the expense of the big cases, especially on a question of initial jurisdiction that we might avoid time, expense, judicial resources, discovery and otherwise. That's exactly what this
case is.

THE COURT: All right. All right.

One other point on that. You mentioned in your pleadings the concern articulated by Justices Kennedy and Souter and concurring opinions about the caution that courts should exercise in dealing with RICO claims and not overlooking constitutional considerations, First Amendment. They didn't say that the First Amendment trumps RICO claim. They didn't say -- and they couldn't have said that. It was all -- well, they said what they said. And you took notice of it and I've taken notice of it, so what does that mean? What does that guidance mean, though?

It doesn't mean that a RICO case can't be prosecuted that has -- that presents legitimate First Amendment constitutional issues because this indeed is the case, right? So, what do we do with those concerns articulated by those justices?

MR. BRAGA: Right. Your Honor is exactly right. It doesn't mean the First Amendment trumps RICO. What it means is that we should only get into this RICO case, we should only deal with these issues carefully as a matter of last resort. And the cases really talk about invading the First Amendment if it's absolutely necessary. It goes to the very heart of the lawsuit.

Now, when you look at the donor allegations in this
case, they're peripheral. The case is overwhelmingly about the ESA case. They're peripheral. They're not well pled. We contend that they don't make a pattern in the complaint. That's the kind of issue that should be evaluated and vetted fully before we tread close to those First Amendment issues by Your Honor, of course, but also by the Circuit Court.

Remember, $1292(b)$ has a failsafe switch here, right? Your Honor can say I'm going to certify it, but the Court of Appeals doesn't have to take it, and it can go very quickly. It's ten days from Your Honor's order that we have to apply, seven days Mr. Simpson to respond, seven days for reply, submit it as a matter of motion without argument.

We have not asked for and 1292(b) does not give us a stay of anything in this court while we wait to see whether they take the appeal. There are things that can be done while we -- while we wait to see whether they take the appeal, and hopefully it gets to Your Honor's other issue about there are going to be some discovery issues no matter what.

THE COURT: In the event there is a certification, is it the Defendant's position that discovery could go forward? That's not mentioned in your pleadings.

MR. BRAGA: Your Honor, our position would be if there is a certification, there's four things Your Honor can do right now in the case while the appeal is pending. We could have briefing on the collateral estoppel issues, which

Mr. Simpson thinks are easy, we think are incredibly hard. We could have briefing on the attorney/client privilege crime fraud waiver, which again the parties are in disputes at. We could have even briefing on the First Amendment donor privilege kind of issues, although that might want to hold in abeyance pending the Circuit Court's resolution, and we could meet on discovery plan.

We aren't in a position to begin discovery yet. It hasn't even opened. There's a lot of work to be done on those competing plans that could be very effectively done, and then take it from there.

THE COURT: Right. Well, the Court was about to delve into the Rule 16 issues, but then the motion was filed, so we quickly put that on the back-burner.

All right, Counsel. Thank you very much.

MR. BRAGA: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Are you okay, or do you want to take a short recess?

COURT REPORTER: No, I'm fine.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Simpson, I'd ask, without repeating those questions, I have some separate questions for you, but without repeating those questions, unless you want me to, I'd ask for your -- you to weigh in on any of the questions.

MR. SIMPSON: May it please the Court, John Simpson
for the Plaintiff. I think it's pretty clear from Western Associates and Edmondson, as well as the Supreme Court's decision in H.J. that you do not need more than one victim to have a closed-end pattern of racketeering activity. The only thing that's impossible under the statute itself, 1961(5), the definition of pattern of racketeering activity, is a single predicate act pattern. Above that, everything else is possible.

You're going to have -- you can have a two predicate act pattern with one victim or a hundred victims. It's just one factor that Judge Rogers in Western and Judge Williams in Edmondson say have to be taken into account. The key question on whether there's a pattern of racketeering activity and what is criminal under RICO and what is a tort under RICO is long-term criminal conduct because the predicate acts themselves are already illegal. It's already a felony to bribe a witness. It's already a felony to engage in money laundering or engage in mail fraud. But what makes it a felony under RICO is to engage in a pattern of such conduct over a long enough period of time.

They don't dispute, they never have disputed that this lasted long enough to be a pattern. They don't dispute and have never really seriously disputed that $1300-\mathrm{plus}$ predicate acts would constitute a pattern. We satisfied that standard, and there was some business about double counting.

It's a crime against the United States to pay a bribe. It is a separate crime to receive one.

Those are separate offenses. The fact that that happens in the connection with one payment doesn't eliminate the fact that there's more than one predicate act. So, under these -- under these various -- under the test adopted by the D.C. Circuit in this circuit for this type of analysis, you look at this on a case-by-case basis.

Number of victims is one factor. You could have a hundred victims and no pattern of racketeering activity. For example, arson is a predicate act. Two fires could be set in two different buildings in an insurance fraud scam and kill a hundred people in the process. Heinous crime, multiple victims, that's not a pattern of racketeering activity because it's not long-term criminal conduct. It's a single episode, even though it was coordinated by conspiracy between the arsonist and the building owner.

On the other hand, it's not at all unusual, although it is rare, as the D.C. Circuit makes clear, that you can have a single victim and have a pattern of racketeering activity. Your Honor found that in the Oceanic Exploration case, which was decided in two-thousand-and -- I believe in 2008 after both Western Associates and Edmondson. It was an allegation by an oil company that they were the victim of a pattern of racketeering activity of bribing foreign officials for
offshore oil leases.

There was only one victim in that case, the corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary, and these are cases we cited in the original motion to dismiss.

Judge Lamberth found a single victim scheme in Elemary versus Holzmann, which is another case we cited in the motion to dismiss, which is 533 F.Supp.2d 116. United States versus Palfrey, which was a criminal prosecution in this district against the so-called D.C. Madam, I think that's an example of perhaps no victims. It was prostitution, adult prostitution, violation of the travel act to commit adult prostitution and money laundering. No focus at all on the victims in that case.

So, I think it's one factor to be taken into account, but seriously, do we really think Congress intended to allow this conduct to occur simply because Feld Entertainment may have been the only victim? Because I would submit that that standing alone is enough to allege and has been alleged a closed-end pattern of racketeering activity, and that's all we're talking about here on the motion for reconsideration.

For example, we haven't even gotten to the question of whether there's an open-ended pattern of racketeering activity, an issue Your Honor never reached. We briefed it, we pleaded it, so I'm getting a little bit ahead of myself
here, but even if you were to agree with everything they said and even if we went upstairs and the D.C. Circuit agreed with everything they said and that got reversed, it's going to come back and then we have to look at the same --

THE COURT: I'm mindful of that as well, and actually, I gave some thought to maybe -- maybe I -- depending on what $I$ do or not do, maybe the Court should address that issue, regardless of what the Court does, open-ended. I didn't -- I didn't feel as though it was necessary to do that, but you raise a point that the court has also thought about. If indeed it went upstairs and they prevailed, it would probably be remanded, so should the Court resolve that issue?

MR. SIMPSON: I think you could -- we were perfectly well -- expected that to be resolved in the last motion. THE COURT: It's a motion for reconsideration, so I didn't consider --

MR. SIMPSON: It's not squarely presented, but it's one of the factors the courts have said defeats the certification request if there are other issues that are going to make this appeal just a sideshow. All it's going to do is delay things.

But my view on this, we don't need more than one victim. There's no reason to believe that this is legal simply because there's one victim. That you can get away with this for a decade, that you can perpetrate a fraud on the

Court through what they did, and the only reason that this isn't a pattern of racketeering activity is because some -just one person happen to get nicked by it.

But even if --

THE COURT: So if the donor fraud allegations went by the wayside, then what?

MR. SIMPSON: And that's how we started out. That's
how this case started out because we weren't aware of all this donor fraud when we filed the original complaint. The only thing we knew about --

THE COURT: Do you need donor fraud allegations to survive?

MR. SIMPSON: I don't think so, but it turns out there are these other issues.

When we first filed the complaint, we didn't know. This was August of 2007 .

THE COURT: Who is defrauded? Feld is not defrauded as a result of mail fraud.

MR. SIMPSON: They didn't take any money from my client based on their solicitations. What they did is they constructed a fraudulent case in order to try to destroy my client's business of operating a circus with elephants.

That's what they did. That's injury to my client. Because without that case, my client is not injured, at least by this. They're not injured by this case.

THE COURT: That's sheer speculation as to whether they gained any money as a result of --

MR. SIMPSON: And that's the other thing about what he just said is wrong. We did plead. We didn't just speculate about it. We specifically pleaded based on what we knew, based on what we know now about the state of the donor fraud situation.

When we first filed this complaint, all we knew about was that 2005 fundraiser, and after you stayed the case, we find out through the deposition of Nicole Paquette that that organization actually used this case to raise money. Then they got their solicitations in discovery, on the last day of discovery, June 30, 2008. That's when they produced that stuff.

Then we lived through the lawsuit itself when we see their maneuvering. Why would anybody do what they did if they weren't trying to prolong this case? Why were they trying to prolong this case? One reason is because it's useful to raise funds, and that's why you have this revised RICO claim. It's also why you have a claim for abuse of process, which wasn't in the original complaint because we didn't know about it.

And all of the discovery --

THE COURT: The donor fraud allegations, though -if $I$ understand you correctly, the donor fraud allegations are irrelevant then to your prosecution of your RICO claim,
correct?

MR. SIMPSON: If it's required that we have to have more than one victim, we've got plenty. We've got plenty of other victims. The people that went to that fundraiser --

THE COURT: You don't believe as a matter of fact and law it's required.

MR. SIMPSON: No.

THE COURT: Then you're willing to forego discovery
with respect to donor allegations?

MR. SIMPSON: If that's all I need to get my client to the goalpost, that would be fine. You really think $I$ want to go through --

THE COURT: Is that "yes?"

MR. SIMPSON: Yes, it is "yes."

THE COURT: You're willing to forego donor
discovery.

MR. SIMPSON: If that's sufficient as a matter of
law. I don't have any interest in their donors. I could care less who wants to give money to these people. I don't care. My client doesn't care. All my client wants is to be made whole and to get justice for what they had to go through.

THE COURT: You rest on the scheme vis-a-vis Feld
itself then perpetrated by Tom Rider, correct?

MR. SIMPSON: No. I'm saying -- I'm saying that we don't need the donor fraud, but we pleaded it adequately and
it's actually -- it actually took place. And this idea that we didn't actually plead that people parted company with their money is not true. We set it out in paragraph 11.

THE COURT: I'm just addressing the issue that, you know, that we've been talking about, First Amendment conflict with RICO, but it doesn't sound as if you're interested in going down that road anyway.

MR. SIMPSON: Why would I buy into that if I didn't need to do that? I'm just trying to get my client its money back and to get what it's entitled to get under the RICO statute. If I don't have to go down donor fraud land, that's fine with me. Why would I want to spend more time on this than is necessary?

They're the ones saying we got to have the extra victims. And how many do we need? Do we need one? Do we need two? Do we need 500? How many do we need? It's all driven by what they say the law is. My view is you only need one. There's no reason to believe Congress intended to give people a pass simply because, everything else being equal, with a pattern, there's only one victim. It's ridiculous. But there are other victims.

THE COURT: It's also ridiculous to think that any of these donors would ever join as a co-plaintiff with --

MR. SIMPSON: That's just a hypothetical argument. Seriously, what are we more likely to find in discovery?

Additional perpetrators or additional victims. And if somebody else -- if somebody else --

THE COURT: I'm not going to go down that road. I have no idea if you find anything at all.

MR. SIMPSON: But the standard at this point is plausibility. Plausibility. THE COURT: As opposed to possibility. MR. SIMPSON: As opposed to possibility. THE COURT: Why is it more plausible than possible, though?

MR. SIMPSON: Because you have false statements of fact that are set forth not only in the fundraiser invitation that we made reference to but also in that letter that Katherine Meyer wrote and circulated on November 11, 2003, that's in the complaint. They have false statements of fact about the case, about Tom Rider, and we know people paid money. We don't know who they are because Your Honor redacted all the names in the other case, so what am I supposed to do? Does it give them more notice for me to say that John or Mary Doe gave money on the basis of this? That's basically what we've said.

Paragraph 11 says that they projected this image of
Rider and his false -- this false image of Rider as an elephant advocate and used it to aggressively seek and obtain donations, not just that it possibly happened. It did happen.

They did raise money on the strength of this case.

Now, who actually gave it to them? I don't know at that point. I had actually, in preparing for this argument, figured out one I could show Your Honor right now, I'm pretty sure, is a victim. We didn't plead it because we're not required under Rule 8, Rule 9 or Rule 12 to get into the weeds like this. Twombly and Iqbal did not overrule the concept of notice pleading. Twombly and Iqbal did not overrule the consent of pleading a case based on information and belief. But we clearly stated what he says is lacking in paragraph 11, in paragraph 92, in paragraph 4, in paragraph 9, all of those -- all of those parts of the complaint make a concrete allegation that fraudulent statements were made about Rider, about this case, and people paid money as a result.

Is it plausible, for example, that the people that went to that fundraiser thought they were given money to pay legal fees in the case? Is it plausible that had someone said, you know what, we're not actually using it that way, we're actually paying him to be a Plaintiff in the lawsuit, and he's not, by the way, paying taxes on this, but we're sending him tax documents that say that's nonemployee compensation to be a paid advocate, which is what he later told the IRS. Now, is it plausible that when those facts come out that one or more of those donors would say, you know what, I'm not giving you the money; I'm going to give it to somebody
else? It's also plausible to go the other way. That's what we're talking about here.

THE COURT: It's implausible to suggest, to think that any of those victims -- I'm using the word loosely at this point -- would join as a co-Plaintiff in this lawsuit, and if so, if that's implausible, isn't that a factor for the Court to consider when determining multiple injuries for victims?

MR. SIMPSON: I think that's a separate matter. I think that's up for the court to -- if that ever happened, which $I$ think is highly unlikely, that's up for the Court to, first of all, nobody's coming into this case without my permission because you can't join my case as a Plaintiff unless I agree with it. I'm not going to agree with complicating it that way.

THE COURT: At the pleading stage, though, how does the Court -- what does the Court do with that?

MR. SIMPSON: I think it's irrelevant at the pleading stage.

THE COURT: It's irrelevant?

MR. SIMPSON: Because -- I mean, on what principle is discovery in a case stopped simply because it might reveal either additional perpetrators or additional victims to the same conduct that the Plaintiff is complaining of? They've cited no authority for that. None. There isn't any. We
should be allowed to pursue that. We should be allowed to pursue it.

This idea that we want to turn over all their donor files is incorrect. I'm only interested in what they did with respect to my client.

THE COURT: You can't get that information anyway, can you?

MR. SIMPSON: Well, according to them, we can't.

There's like a First Amendment right to do this.

THE COURT: What about Supreme Court precedent?

MR. SIMPSON: Well, no, I don't think that's exactly
correct. I think when it comes to discovery of this
information --

THE COURT: I'm sure if the case sticks around,
we'll have enough time to debate that, I'm sure.

MR. SIMPSON: Right. I think the other question,

Your Honor, was the API standing point.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SIMPSON: The D.C. Circuit ruled in no uncertain terms that API had no standing to sue, period. Now, what they did say --

THE COURT: Wait a minute, wait a minute. In the

2011 opinion?

MR. SIMPSON: Yes, yes, had no standing because information theory was invalid as a matter of law and wasn't
proven. In this resource draining theory, some validity as a matter of law but ultimately never proven. THE COURT: Never proven.

MR. SIMPSON: Yeah. And not because this is some accident that Judge Tatel just happened to come up with at argument, what about this. This is their own theory. This is a theory they've been talking about in this case since it was filed. They brought it up during the trial. They submitted a proposed finding on it. They brought it up in the final argument. What they didn't bring it up in is the brief you ordered them to file on standing. But it was raised in the trial court. They never offered any evidence, and I submit it's because they didn't have any such evidence. There is no evidence of a public misperception. There is no evidence that API spent any money countering that.

THE COURT: Well, what the Circuit said was API
never proved its claim.

MR. SIMPSON: That's correct, but --
THE COURT: The Circuit didn't say it didn't have standing, though, did it?

MR. SIMPSON: They affirmed your determination that they had no standing. They had no standing as a matter of fact. There is no injury. And remember, this is an injury that if you have it, you have to have it when you sue, at the time you sue. So, for the original Plaintiffs, it was 2000,
and for API it was 2005.
Where's their evidence? It's in your hand when you walk in the courthouse door. Why wasn't it put on during the trial? Is it because the lawyer who did the questioning is incompetent? I don't think so. It's because they didn't have it, and I don't think it matters whether your theory is invalid legally or whether it fails because you never had the proof. You still lost the issue.

THE COURT: I don't think it's necessary for the Court to speculate. It wasn't proven. That's the bottom line.

MR. SIMPSON: That's correct. And so what do they propose to do now? Prove it in this case after your finding was affirmed, finding 53 was affirmed and rehearing was denied and cert was never sought? Now we're going to have a collateral attack on that finding in this case? I don't think that's how it works. I don't think that's how it works.

THE COURT: Let me ask you -- let's go back to those fundraising letters for a second.

MR. SIMPSON: Yes.

THE COURT: You relied on those 2003 fundraising letters as an additional basis for this donor fraud. Those letters ask for money for Rider to perform advocacy and media work and that's what he was doing. No one disputes he was doing that.

The letters list over a dozen appearances, multiple stage performing work for the organizations. That's legal work. How is asking donors for money so he can continue this work donor fraud, unless I'm misunderstanding your theory?

MR. SIMPSON: Because that's not all he was doing, Judge. And it's interesting, because in that very letter, which I believe is -- is Exhibit 4 to our opposition, we think, first of all, and we alleged in the complaint that this was not just sent to Catherine Liss. This was disseminated far and wide to other potential donors because it's obviously a form document that's for mass distribution. But over on page 2 of that letter, she says all we need here for Mr. Rogers' media outreach for 2004 is $\$ 10,000$. That's all we need. That will fund it for the entire year.

The problem, though, is they paid him 24,000. So, yeah, they did pay him to do media work, but they also paid him the other 14 to do something else, and we submit it was to be a witness in the case and to be a Plaintiff. Because, as Your Honor found in the case, he never did enough media work to account for the money he was paid, and this is a classic example of that. They sent him a 1099 for that year, 2004, for nonemployee compensation of $\$ 23,900$. It's an exhibit in the trial. So that's our point.

It's not an unusual situation where a witness is bribed, and because there's some proper purpose for the money,
it's done in order to make it look like something other than what it was. That's not unusual at all. But in this case, it's pretty clear from that document that they spent -- that they had other monies that they paid him for other purposes.

THE COURT: The 2005 fundraiser, if -- if your allegations of donor fraud come down to that fundraiser and nothing more, is that enough to pursue a pattern theory?

MR. SIMPSON: I think it's -- again, it's a flexible theory. It's a case-by-case situation. There's a situation where I don't know how many people went. Maybe it was a hundred, maybe it was one, but if one person, if one person wrote a check based on a false statement about what Rider was doing or going to do, then that's another victim of the same scheme.

THE COURT: But it gets down to "if," as opposed to alleging that someone did.

MR. SIMPSON: We allege that it happened. We just don't know who it is, and I think it's entirely unfair at this point --

THE COURT: How can you in good faith allege -well, you can allege that it happened, that there was this fundraiser, that invitations were sent out and that people appeared, and based upon discovery, you can allege that money was received, correct?

MR. SIMPSON: Yes. But what they're trying to hold
me to is a standard that says it is entirely implausible, as a matter of law, that anybody was defrauded. In other words, every single person, whoever wrote a check --

THE COURT: It certainly wouldn't be Feld defrauded as a result of --

MR. SIMPSON: No, no, I'm talking about donors. No donors, it's impossible, implausible, that any donor, whether it's one, 500 or five million, that any of these people, had they known the truth about Rider, would have made a different decision. It's just so implausible, and that's just ridiculous. There's no -- there's no case that says that. It defies common sense.

If I lie to you about what I'm going to do with the money and you give me the money and then you find out the truth, it's implausible you want your money back? I think that's what really drives their argument. It's not that there isn't going to be other victims. They're concerned about collateral consequences when these other victims emerge, but I didn't set this in motion. I'm not the one in here telling you you need all these other victims. It's them. It's them.

And again, it leads wherever it leads. I didn't open that door. I didn't create this situation. My client didn't pay Tom Rider. My client didn't bring this case. My client got picked off and targeted and had to deal with this case based on their fraudulent claims, and here we are trying
to deal with it ten years later in a case that's been pending for six years with no discovery at all.

Just on the certification point, Your Honor, unless you had another question.

THE COURT: I did. Wait just one second. I have my Havens Realty question. You alluded to it. The motion for reconsideration also focuses on causation, and let's assume, for purposes of this discussion, that API had standing under Havens Realty but just failed at trial as a matter of proof. They didn't offer anything. We know that. If Feld would have had to spend some legal fees defending ESA lawsuits, separate and apart from Rider's claims, does that defeat Feld's standing as a matter of law under Holmes, Ansa and the other causation cases?

MR. SIMPSON: No, because we would have had to spend money on Rider. There's a certain amount of money we spent on Rider we never would have spent. If all he was was a fact witness in the case, there wouldn't have been any effort, you know, focused on his standing, his esthetic injury, all the issues that go with that. We filed briefs on that. We had interrogatories directed at that, whole parts of his deposition, and I would submit my entire cross-examination at trial was centrally based on that, was centrally based on the fact that this guy's anchoring this case. So, you take all that out --

THE COURT: So Feld would still have standing -MR. SIMPSON: Absolutely, absolutely.

THE COURT: If he came in with a itemization of fees spent to defend against other claims --

MR. SIMPSON: Absolutely. They can be segregated out. There are certain things that were very Rider standing specific, but it doesn't minimize the misconduct here. It doesn't minimize the misconduct because they still did what they did. They still paid this guy. He still lied under oath and made misrepresentations to the Court of Appeals that induced this case to go on for ten years. That happened. That has to be addressed at some point.

Now, whether Feld comes out of this with only standing as to the Rider standing stuff and it's only $\$ 100,000--\quad$ don't even know if that's accurate; I'm sure it's not -- it's still a violation of the statute.

THE COURT: Let me just say, this court never made any finding that he made misrepresentations to the Court of Appeals, and I don't think the Court of Appeals made any findings either. Talking about the first appeal, the Court of Appeals said, look, he's alleged all this, you -- he made allegations that he couldn't prove when put to the test.

MR. SIMPSON: Well, I would slightly disagree with
that. I think your finding 60 through 63 pretty clearly says that the statements he made to the Court of Appeals were
untruthful. I mean, that's the language that was used.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I didn't accuse him of perjury or anything.

MR. SIMPSON: That's correct. That word was not used.

THE COURT: That's academic anyway. So, he was sent back, he got his fair day in court, and yes, it was years later. But you know, the case took the direction that it should have because there was at least one individual that had standing. It was unnecessary for the court to deal with any other organization at that point because one had standing, correct, or at least --

MR. SIMPSON: Well, this is like me. It's like a defendant in an automobile accident on the ground that if $I$ hadn't run you down, then you wouldn't have a claim. Well, that's true, I wouldn't have a claim, but you did run me down. They didn't have the evidence. That's the problem here.

If they had this injury, why didn't they prove it? Because they didn't base it on some case that just came out yesterday. It was based on Spann versus Colonial Realty, was decided in 1990. Justice Ginsburg, then Judge Ginsburg made it clear, you want to pursue this theory, this is what you got to prove. No. 1, that there is a misperception among renters that this housing is from -- not for minorities, and No. 2, you spent resources on it. It was clear. So why didn't they
prove that? They were unaware of the case? They cited the case in every brief they had.

No, they didn't have the injury. They didn't have the proof, and so whether you lose it on the law or lose it on the facts, you still lose it. You don't have standing, period, end of story, and that's why --

THE COURT: And it can't be resurrected here.

MR. SIMPSON: You cannot be resurrecting it after the fact. Collateral estoppel or not, I think that completely bars them, but they had a chance. They could have brought this up to the D.C. Circuit. When they -- when they pursued this appeal, they were fully aware of what my position was in this case about causation because we were briefing the motion to dismiss at the same time. In fact, they got in here and said, "Judge, wait for the appeal, wait for the appeal because we're going to win on standing. API is going to have standing, please wait," and you did.

Now, I don't know if it's why you waited, but there was a delay. Of course, it turns out API didn't have standing. They lost.

THE COURT: I didn't stay the case, did I? Did I?

I don't think I stayed the case.

MR. SIMPSON: You didn't stay the case, but there was a delay after that argument was made, so that was my inference that you were waiting for the D.C. Circuit, but be
that as it may, what came back from D.C. Circuit, no standing. So they knew what the consequences were. They knew what $I$ was saying. They didn't raise this argument. They could have. They could have made -- taken an issue with that. They didn't do it. It's over. Done.

THE COURT: The Defendants argue that if this case goes forward, it puts the donors in a constitutional -- and I'm quoting -- suspect Catch-22. Would they say they would have given money to the organization even if they knew Rider had no standing to maintain the lawsuit? They could be joined as co-Defendants in this case. What do you have to say about that argument?

MR. SIMPSON: Well, I think it's again it's making -- it's a construct that has no basis in reality. It has no basis in reality.

What you're going to get are people that are either -- they're going to say --

THE COURT: Would the donors have a viable RICO claim?

MR. SIMPSON: Well, it wouldn't be my position to advise them on that. I don't want to complicate this case with other Plaintiffs. That's not my intention. But again, you don't cut this off simply because discovery in a federal lawsuit might reveal additional victims and perpetrators. You just don't do that. There's no principle for that.

The way discovery should be handled in this case is I think illustrated by Judge Norma Holloway Johnson's opinion in the Greyhound case where First Amendment arguments were raised about discovery, and she, first of all, ruled that to the extent that the discovery party already knows about who these donors are, the First Amendment doesn't even come into play.

THE COURT: Yeah. But that's not -- that's not an issue here, though. I'm sorry, that is an issue here because you don't know who the donors are.

MR. SIMPSON: We know some of them, and I could give you an example of one $I$ found getting ready for this argument, somebody I'm pretty confident is a victim. I now know her identity because they produced it in the other case.

THE COURT: Was produced subject to protective order.

MR. SIMPSON: No. They put her name into the trial record in Exhibit 94A. If your --

THE COURT: Without using the person's name, why don't you make your point if you can.

MR. SIMPSON: This woman wrote a letter. She went to a rally in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in November, I believe, of 2003 and listened to a speech made by Tom Rider. And just as we alleged in the complaint, she fell for this image of Tom Rider, the selfless elephant advocate traveling the
countryside at great personal inconvenience and at great personal sacrifice, because she wrote a letter to Katherine Meyer saying, I'm so in awe by Mr. Rider and it's so impressive that he's working alone and without pay.

Now, he either said that or she was strongly led to believe that based on what went on at that rally. Sure enough, three weeks later, there's a thank you note from WAP to her, name redacted, handwriting is the same, thank you for your check, \$25, Check No. 2467 noted on the letter.

Well, you go look at Check 2467, which WAP produced with no redacted signature, it's pretty clearly the same person. That same person who signed that letter signed that check. It's the same person. And not only that, she continued for the next three years to make regular donations to WAP based on, as her note to Mr. Glitzenstein said, based on your humane work for the Ringling Brothers' animals.

So, I would say that's a pretty good indication of someone who has no idea how they're spending this money. They're spending this money to give this man a salary. He made a false statement of fact or he clearly led her to believe he was working without pay when in that same timeframe, November 2003, he was being paid $\$ 500$ a week and he was working with all these other organizations hand-in-glove. He wasn't alone. He was working for pay as he later told the IRS. He was a paid advocate. That's a woman that we think,
in a deposition, might say, likely would say, you know what, I wouldn't have given them money, or you know, what's worse for them maybe, $I$ want it back now.

That's just one example. We think there are hundreds of people like that. There are others in that same cluster of thank you notes that they wrote to this person. They wrote notes to three or four other people from the same area of the country, in Pennsylvania. Likely inference, they all went to that same rally. Likely inference, they all gave money based on what Rider said.

So we're not talking about something that's totally speculative. We're not talking about "if." We're talking about something that happened. The only thing that's impeded our ability to show it is the fact that in the other case, their identities were redacted. Their identities were redacted.

In this -- this scheme that injured my client is the same scheme that injured these donors because they're raising money based on the lawsuit. They're not simply saying we don't like bull hooks and we don't like chains and we don't like Ringling Brothers' use of those instruments, so please give us money. They're saying all that, but they're also saying, by the way, we've got this lawsuit. We're suing them. Please send us money to help us fight this fight. They're using the case. The case doesn't exist without the fraud.

The injury my client has incurred doesn't exist without the racketeering, and their ability to raise money on the strength of that case doesn't exist without the racketeering, and that's where they come together.

Now, not every predicate act that my client was victimized by victimized every donor and vice versa, but you don't have to have that. You just have to have a pattern of racketeering activity that is sufficiently continuous and consists of related enough acts that it constitutes long-term criminal conduct, and that's what the statute is designed to deal with.

THE COURT: If the case is certified, do you agree that discovery can go forward or, as counsel alluded to, that the Court may be in a position to resolve other issues of law that don't require any discovery?

MR. SIMPSON: I think that all of that ought to
happen, Your Honor. That's what Judge Kessler did in Philip Morris. That case went forward, notwithstanding the certification.

THE COURT: Right. It's very late, almost approaching trial.

MR. SIMPSON: Right. They were on the eve of trial.
She said, "I'm not going to move this trial date."

Judge Hogan, in the Vitamins case, stated, "Okay.
I'm going to certify this question but we're going to go
forward with discovery."

So, at minimum, that's got to happen, it seems to
me. I mean, this case was filed six years ago.

THE COURT: What has to happen?

MR. SIMPSON: Discovery has got to go forward. We can do some of these other things. I think you do it all. I think you do it all.

THE COURT: Do you agree there are legal issues that could be addressed, if not resolved, that don't require any discovery, or not?

MR. SIMPSON: The collateral estoppel point is, I would say, a purely legal issue, and we put that in our discovery plan as something that the Court should consider up front.

THE COURT: What's the prejudice to the Plaintiffs then if the Court certifies and allows legal issues to be addressed that can be addressed, allows discovery to go forward that can be? Although I anticipate, if the Court were to certify it, immediately, if not sooner, a motion to stay all discovery will follow.

MR. SIMPSON: Exactly. I mean, who are they
kidding? They're saying -- they're being coy, but as soon as you issue that order, that's going to be the next filing, either here or in the D.C. Circuit, stay discovery. Oh, we can't do discovery. We're going to have an appeal. We're
going to win the appeal. Just like they told you last time, they're going to win the ASPCA appeal. Just like they told you when they stayed discovery in this case, we're going to win the motion to dismiss. So it goes on and on and on.

We are in the sixth year of this case. At some point it starts to prejudice the Plaintiff, and I think we've already reached that point. Six years we're into this, we haven't taken a single deposition. We haven't even had the discovery conference, let alone do discovery. And even if they're right --

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Wait a minute, you had a conference.

MR. SIMPSON: We had a scheduling conference. We haven't had a Rule 26 conference. That got postponed on account of this motion.

THE COURT: Right. Yeah. Yeah.

MR. SIMPSON: So, we haven't even gotten to the basic groundwork of what is it going to look like, you know, much less get it done. That all that has to continue. It prejudices my client to continue to wait because that's all we're getting is the runaround. Whatever they think they need to tell you to avoid discovery, they're going to say. That's all this motion is. It's just to buy more time. It's what they told you when we were in there on the motion to dismiss. Oh, no, you can't -- it's in the RICO case, no way. This is
all about attorney's fees and sanctions. You need to deal with this misconduct in the other case. Go sanction them in the other case, and then Ms. Steel got up here and offered her clients up for that. Just sanction them under 1927 in the other case.

So, when we go to the other case and seek sanctions and seek to shift fees --

THE COURT: I don't think she offered her clients
up, did she?

MR. SIMPSON: That's what I interpreted that to mean.

THE COURT: I didn't, and I didn't act on that either.

MR. SIMPSON: But when we get to the other case, what do they say? No, you're not entitled to anything. You get nothing. You get nothing because everything we did is fine.

THE COURT: Your clients don't have to worry. No, no, I wouldn't have done it if she had asked for it.

MR. SIMPSON: That's an example. This is just another part of that. This conduct isn't going to go away, Your Honor. This is not a petition that's filed by someone at Guantanamo making up stuff because he thinks that there's some policy against him, like in the Iqbal case.

This is something -- this is based on facts that not
only happened, but you found took place after a trial. And what we're dealing with in this case --

THE COURT: You said it's not like GTMO because of what?

MR. SIMPSON: Well, like the Iqbal case. That guy --

THE COURT: Iqbal, not the --
MR. SIMPSON: He was some kind of detainee. He may not have been in Guantanamo, but he was a detainee.

THE COURT: I don't think he was.
MR. SIMPSON: He'd been arrested, and his theory was
there's --

THE COURT: I don't think he was in Guantanamo.
MR. SIMPSON: -- this grand policy against detaining people like me, that the Justice Department, Attorney General Ashcroft has adopted based on my national origin, and that's not plausible. There was no such policy. We're talking about facts that actually not only happened but you found happened. We're dealing with a fundamentally different case.

I would point out that that -- although they don't like to hear this, there's a public interest that goes with this lawsuit. The RICO --

THE COURT: The public is the victim in RICO actions.

MR. SIMPSON: This is a private Attorney General
case. That's exactly how the Supreme Court of the United States has described the private RICO case. It's precisely because the Justice Department doesn't have time to deal with all the crime in the United States that this cause of action was created, and it's important to get on with it.

If we're right, it's really a problem that this happened and that the court system was abused this way. And if we're wrong, then it's important that that be determined as well, but there's a public interest here and it's getting defeated every time we come in here with these side-track motions and these attempts to delay the inevitable, and that's all this is.

So, if it -- if it does get certified, then we've got to go forward with these other issues. The one thing I think -- I mean, crime fraud, I think, I would disagree that this is the appropriate thing to be briefing now. I think that's ultimately going to be an issue, but $I$ think until you get a specific context with respect to testimony or with respect to someone's e-mail or with respect to the documents, it's hard to determine that in the abstract, so I think the discovery has to be done first and then you deal with that once the objections are made. Once you get an index, once someone is instructed not to answer a question, because until, you're just dealing with it in the abstract.

I don't think there's any doubt, ultimately, that a
large part of what they're going to claim the attorney/client privilege for is subject to the crime fraud exception because the lawyers are in the middle of this. They weren't just standing by like the accountants in the Reves case doing their little accounting thing while racketeering and conspiracy going on. They're in the middle of it. So I think that's going to be the case, but it's going to be hard for the Court to deal with that in the abstract.

The First Amendment point he brought up, I don't see any reason to get into that now either, because again, I think that's discovery driven. It's going to be depending on who we're talking about. I mean, a lot of, part of, you know, this donor fraud discovery has to be linked to this case. I can't just go in there and say $I$ want all your donor records. No, I can't do that.

I have reason to believe, based on what we already know, that they used this case to raise money, which means there's correspondence to that effect, which means in the case of the big organization, such as ASPCA and HSUS who use professional fundraising solicitors and professional fundraising advisors, that there's actually either reports, documents and other types of information that analyze this because they pay millions of dollars a year to be advised professionally by inside the beltway-type people on how to raise money and what works and what doesn't work.

If -- if they had such analyses done, that has to get produced. If, for example, they had notes like was sent, that unnamed person I discussed with WAP, people send in a donation, oh, I think it's wonderful what Tom Rider is doing, right, that all has to be produced. That all has to be produced. It all has to be related to the case, to Feld Entertainment's elephants and to Tom Rider, because without that, there's no link to a racketeering claim.

So, that vastly, I think, overstated how broad this is, and I think there's also, there has never been any proffer by anybody about how burdensome this supposedly really is. Nobody has ever given you any evidence about how many e-mails they have, how many documents they have. They just say, oh, we don't want to do it. It's burdensome.

How do I know it's burdensome? How do I know it even still exists? We don't know, because they haven't done the discovery yet. That's why we need to get forward moving, leaning forward and getting this case going because the more delays like this that happened, it's a ship that's dead in the water.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Did you have anything you wanted to respond to briefly, Counsel?

MR. BRAGA: Yes, Your Honor, just a handful of points. I recognize I'm the only thing standing between everybody and lunch. First of all, on behalf of the Defense
group.

COURT REPORTER: Judge, I have to have just five
minutes real quick. I need to maybe switch with another court
reporter because I'm supposed to be in another court.

THE COURT: All right. That's fine. We'll take a
short ten-minute recess.
(1:55 P.M.; A BRIEF RECESS WAS TAKEN.)
(SWITCH COURT REPORTERS.)
*_*_*_*
CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
I, Catalina Kerr, certify that the foregoing is a
correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the
above-entitled matter.
Catalina Kerr
Date


| A Case 1:07-cv-01532-EGS-J | appearences [4 |  banc 11 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| alleging[2] 7/18 54/16 | applicability [1] 22/22 | bars [1] 59/10 |
| allow [1] 41/16 | application [1] 25/20 | base [1] 58/19 |
| allowed [2] 50/1 50/1 | apply [2] 9/1 37/10 | based [19] 8/25 43/20 44/5 44/6 48/9 54/12 |
| allows [2] 65/16 65/17 | appreciate [2] 6/20 7/3 | 54/23 55/25 56/23 56/23 58/20 62/6 62/15 |
| alluded [2] 56/6 64/13 | approaching [1] 64/21 | 62/15 63/10 63/19 67/25 68/16 70/16 |
| almost [1] 64/20 | appropriate [3] 27/23 28/7 69/16 | basic [1] 66/18 |
| alone [5] 14/19 41/18 62/4 62/24 66/9 | are [60] 6/1 6/11 6/21 7/23 8/2 10/19 13/22 | basically [1] 47/20 |
| already [9] 18/1 29/25 33/24 39/16 39/16 | 15/17 21/14 21/25 23/6 23/10 23/20 26/12 | basis [10] 14/11 17/12 17/19 24/9 26/23 40/8 |
| 39/17 61/5 66/7 70/16 | 26/15 26/16 27/22 28/4 28/23 30/20 33/4 | 47/20 52/22 60/14 60/15 |
| also [16] 8/8 14/10 15/2 22/7 32/4 33/25 37/6 | 33/9 33/9 33/12 33/17 33/17 33/19 34/1 34/4 | Bazan [2] 1/12 4/9 |
| 42/10 44/20 46/22 47/13 49/1 53/16 56/7 | 34/17 37/15 37/17 38/1 38/1 38/3 38/17 | be [99] |
| 63/22 71/10 | 39/16 40/3 41/3 42/19 42/19 43/14 44/24 | because [86] |
| although [4] 38/5 40/18 65/18 68/20 | 46/21 46/25 47/12 47/17 55/25 57/6 60/16 | been [25] 7/4 12/14 14/11 17/9 19/3 19/5 |
| always [2] 4/13 4/14 | 60/16 61/6 61/10 63/4 63/5 65/8 65/21 66/5 | 19/6 20/9 21/13 22/25 23/5 23/23 29/10 |
| am [5] 6/19 7/5 26/11 29/13 47/18 | 69/22 70/3 | 30/16 33/23 34/12 41/17 41/19 46/5 51/7 |
| amazed [2] 33/5 33/5 | area [1] 63/8 | 56/1 56/18 68/9 68/11 71/10 |
| ambiguity [1] 17/17 | aren't [4] 7/24 32/13 33/8 38/8 | before [5] 1/8 10/3 19/24 25/15 37/5 |
| amended [7] 7/15 8/10 9/17 10/8 12/8 13/2 | argue [2] 14/10 60/6 | begin [1] 38/8 |
| 17/6 | argued [1] 20/23 | behalf [8] 4/25 5/5 5/12 5/15 5/18 6/23 20/7 |
| Amendment [15] 32/6 32/8 33/18 36/7 36/8 | argument [23] 8/3 8/4 12/5 12/6 14/15 14/16 | 71/25 |
| 36/14 36/19 36/22 37/5 38/4 46/5 50/9 61/3 | 14/19 18/12 21/4 22/3 22/16 26/21 32/23 | being [7] 9/8 10/12 27/9 31/23 46/19 62/22 |
| 61/6 70/9 | 37/12 46/24 48/3 51/6 51/10 55/16 59/24 | 65/22 |
| AMERICAN [3] 1/5 2/15 4/5 | 60/3 60/12 61/12 | belief [1] 48/9 |
| Americas [1] 2/16 | arguments [3] 5/22 6/7 61/3 | believe [16] 19/17 20/2 25/10 28/13 29/8 |
| among [2] 17/14 58/23 | around [3] 23/23 27/6 50/14 | 32/14 32/24 40/22 42/23 45/5 46/18 53/7 |
| amount [1] 56/16 | arrested [1] 68/11 | 61/22 62/6 62/21 70/16 |
| analogy [1] 25/13 | arson [1] 40/11 | believed [1] 16/21 |
| analyses [1] 71/1 | arsonist [1] 40/17 | BELKNAP [2] 2/15 5/12 |
| analysis [1] 40/7 | articulate [1] 29/15 | beltway [1] 70/24 |
| analyze [1] 70/22 | articulated [3] 20/7 36/4 36/16 | beltway-type [1] 70/24 |
| anchoring [1] 56/24 | as [85] | benefit [1] $5 / 20$ |
| and/or [2] 8/18 9/11 | Ashcroft [1] 68/16 | benefits [1] 5/19 |
| Andrew [2] 2/7 5/4 | ask [8] 5/25 7/12 14/22 35/5 38/20 38/23 | best [1] 24/24 |
| ANIMAL [2] 3/2 5/18 | asked [5] 9/17 34/23 35/5 37/13 67/19 | between [4] 15/5 32/7 40/16 71/24 |
| animals [6] 1/6 1/21 2/17 4/5 4/19 62/16 | asking [2] 24/16 53/3 | beyond [1] 11/11 |
| another [9] 7/23 8/11 29/6 41/6 54/13 56/4 | ASPCA [3] 5/12 66/2 70/19 | big [9] 10/3 25/8 28/1 29/4 31/20 33/19 |
| 67/21 72/3 72/4 | asserted [1] 21/21 | 34/14 35/23 70/19 |
| Ansa [1] 56/13 | associated [1] 33/24 | bit [4] 16/6 25/17 29/20 41/25 |
| answer [4] 7/9 15/2 35/10 69/23 | Associates [4] 10/24 11/16 39/2 40/23 | bnes [1] 2/14 |
| answered [1] 14/6 | assume [1] 56/7 | BOCKIUS [1] $2 / 12$ |
| answers [3] 6/4 6/6 6/7 | assure [1] 6/21 | bold [1] 10/3 |
| anticipate [1] 65/18 | attack [1] 52/16 | BORN [2] 2/19 5/15 |
| anticipated [1] 4/12 | attempts [1] 69/11 | both [9] 6/1 6/11 6/13 8/19 25/11 25/15 31/9 |
| Antitrust [1] 25/22 | attention [3] 8/4 14/13 33/8 | 31/11 40/23 |
| any [32] 5/20 7/10 9/10 16/10 18/6 23/4 | attorney [5] 6/9 38/2 68/15 68/25 70/1 | bothers [1] 26/9 |
| 31/19 34/4 34/10 34/17 38/24 43/19 44/2 | attorney's [1] 67/1 | bottom [1] 52/10 |
| 45/18 46/22 49/4 49/25 51/12 51/13 51/15 | attorney/client [2] 38/2 70/1 | boy [2] 27/1 27/4 |
| 55/7 55/8 56/18 57/18 57/19 58/10 64/15 | attorneys [1] 6/1 | Brad [2] 2/12 5/9 |
| 65/9 69/25 70/10 71/10 71/12 | attributable [4] 21/21 22/1 22/12 22/12 | BRAGA [4] $1 / 181 / 18$ 4/22 6/22 |
| anybody [4] 18/20 44/16 55/2 71/11 | atypical [3] 23/16 23/25 24/1 | bragalaw [1] 1/20 |
| anymore [1] 19/6 | August [1] 43/16 | bribe [2] 39/17 40/1 |
| anyone [1] 9/13 | authorities [1] 11/25 | bribed [1] 53/25 |
| anything [10] 19/7 23/11 33/18 33/24 37/14 | authority [2] 22/24 49/25 | bribery [4] 11/6 11/17 13/6 13/8 |
| 47/4 56/10 58/3 67/15 71/22 | automobile [1] 58/14 | bribing [1] 40/25 |
| anyway [5] 35/2 35/15 46/7 50/6 58/6 | available [2] 9/20 30/7 | Bridge [1] 21/7 |
| anywhere [1] 34/10 | Avenue [4] 1/13 2/8 2/13 2/16 | brief [4] 6/21 51/10 59/2 72/7 |
| Anza [3] 21/8 21/19 22/14 | avoid [2] 35/24 66/22 | briefed [2] 19/24 41/24 |
| apart [1] 56/12 | aware [4] 23/4 34/17 43/8 59/12 | briefing [5] 37/25 38/2 38/4 59/13 69/16 |
| APCC [1] 27/14 | away [4] 13/12 30/5 42/24 67/21 | briefly [1] 71/22 |
| API [18] 19/15 20/7 20/9 20/15 21/2 21/10 | awe [1] $62 / 3$ | briefs [2] 32/11 56/20 |
| 21/13 21/17 22/4 22/12 50/17 50/20 51/15 | AWI[1] 9/5 | bring [2] 51/10 55/23 |
| 51/16 52/1 56/8 59/16 59/19 | B | broad [1] 71/9 |
| apologize [2] 4/11 4/15 | baby [2] 17/9 17/13 | brought [5] 14/13 51/8 51/9 59/10 70/9 |
| apparently [1] 9/19 | back [19] 9/23 9/24 10/11 13/4 14/7 14/20 | building [1] 40/17 |
| appeal [11] 37/15 37/16 37/24 42/20 57/20 | 15/1 19/20 23/6 26/1 35/6 38/14 42/4 46/10 | buildings [1] 40/12 |
| 59/12 59/15 59/15 65/25 66/1 66/2 | 52/18 55/15 58/7 60/1 63/3 | bull [1] 63/20 |
| appeals [9] 14/23 19/24 29/12 37/9 57/10 | back-burner [1] 38/14 | bunch [1] 13/24 |


|  | chirsen 6 <br> 20/15 20/23 20/25 23/5 25/15 25/17 26/20 <br> 28/13 29/3 29/11 32/12 32/14 32/15 32/16 <br> $32 / 2032 / 2433 / 1133 / 1435 / 1537 / 638 / 6$ 40/7 40/7 40/19 42/2 50/19 51/16 51/19 59/11 59/25 60/1 65/24 <br> Circuit's [1] 19/14 circulated [1] 47/14 circulation [1] 22/15 circus [1] 43/22 cite [3] 27/7 27/13 27/15 <br> cited [5] 34/12 41/4 41/6 49/25 59/1 <br> City [1] 5/21 <br> Civil [1] 4/4 <br> claim [11] 22/16 36/8 44/19 44/20 44/25 <br> 51/17 58/15 58/16 60/19 70/1 71/8 <br> claimed [1] 21/14 <br> claims [4] 36/6 55/25 56/12 57/4 <br> clarity [1] 7/24 <br> classic [1] 53/20 <br> clear [8] 7/19 9/3 27/3 39/1 40/19 54/3 58/22 58/25 <br> clearly [5] 25/14 48/10 57/24 62/11 62/20 <br> clerked [1] 27/2 <br> client [17] 38/2 43/20 43/23 43/24 45/10 <br> 45/20 45/20 46/9 50/5 55/22 55/23 55/24 <br> 63/17 64/1 64/5 66/20 70/1 <br> client's [1] 43/22 <br> clients [3] 67/4 67/8 67/18 <br> close [2] 18/3 37/5 <br> closed [2] 39/4 41/19 <br> closed-end [2] 39/4 41/19 <br> cluster [1] $63 / 6$ <br> co [6] 31/3 31/6 31/17 46/23 49/5 60/11 <br> co-Defendants [1] 60/11 <br> co-Plaintiff [2] 46/23 49/5 <br> co-victim [2] 31/3 31/6 <br> co-victims [1] 31/17 <br> cogent [1] 29/13 <br> collateral [5] 37/25 52/16 55/18 59/9 65/11 <br> colleagues [1] 33/4 <br> collected [1] 17/9 <br> Collyer [2] 3/35/17 <br> Colonial [1] 58/20 <br> COLUMBIA [1] $1 / 1$ <br> Combining [1] 25/24 <br> come [13] 4/3 14/7 14/20 21/12 33/22 35/6 <br> 42/3 48/23 51/5 54/6 61/6 64/4 69/10 <br> comes [4] 35/13 35/18 50/12 57/13 <br> coming [1] 49/12 <br> commit [1] 41/11 <br> committed [2] 11/2 11/4 <br> Committee [1] 35/20 <br> common [1] 55/12 <br> Communications [1] 27/14 <br> company [2] 40/24 46/2 <br> compelling [3] 14/16 28/11 33/7 <br> compensation [2] 48/22 53/22 <br> competing [2] 5/22 38/10 <br> complain [1] 17/14 <br> complaining [1] 49/24 <br> complaint [34] 7/15 8/10 8/21 9/2 9/6 9/15 <br> 9/17 9/25 9/25 10/1 10/4 10/7 10/8 10/11 <br> $\begin{array}{lllllllllll}11 / 23 & 11 / 24 & 12 / 9 & 13 / 2 & 17 / 7 & 17 / 19 & 17 / 21 \\ 18 / 21 & 18 / 23 & 18 / 24 & 31 / 6 & 37 / 3 & 43 / 9 & 43 / 15 & 44 / 8\end{array}$ <br> 44/21 47/15 48/12 53/8 61/24 <br> complaints [1] 34/16 <br> completely [2] $21 / 215$ $59 / 9$ <br> complexity [2] 33/6 33/13 <br> complicate [1] 60/21 <br> complicated [3] 28/19 28/22 33/12 <br> concept [1] 48/7 <br> concern [3] 14/25 33/19 36/4 <br> concerned [3] 29/1 29/2 55/17 <br> concerns [2] 34/15 36/16 <br> concrete [1] 48/12 <br> concurring [1] 36/5 <br> $\begin{array}{lll}\text { conduct [8] } & 31 / 839 / 15 ~ 39 / 19 ~ 40 / 15 ~ 41 / 16 ~\end{array}$ 49/24 64/10 67/21 <br> conference [4] 66/9 66/12 66/13 66/14 <br> confident [1] 61/13 <br> conflict [2] 32/6 46/5 <br> Congress [2] 41/15 46/18 <br> congressmen [1] 28/7 <br> Conley [2] 15/22 26/1 <br> connection [1] 40/4 <br> consent [1] 48/9 <br> consequences [2] 55/18 60/2 <br> consider [4] 5/21 42/16 49/7 65/13 <br> consideration [2] 19/23 29/12 <br> considerations [1] 36/7 <br> considered [1] 15/3 <br> considering [1] 15/6 <br> consisting [1] $11 / 6$ <br> consists [1] 64/9 <br> conspiracy [2] 40/16 70/5 <br> constitute [3] 13/5 13/9 39/24 <br> constitutes [6] 13/4 13/6 13/7 13/7 13/8 64/9 <br> constitutional [4] 34/15 36/7 36/15 60/7 <br> construct [1] 60/14 <br> constructed [1] 43/21 <br> CONT'D [2] $2 / 13 / 1$ <br> contend [1] 37/3 <br> context [2] 34/19 69/18 <br> continue [3] 53/3 66/19 66/20 <br> continued [2] 14/4 62/14 <br> continuous [1] 64/8 <br> controlling [3] 14/11 18/13 22/18 <br> coordinated [1] 40/16 <br> copy [1] 11/24 <br> corollary [1] 21/24 <br> corporation [1] 41/3 <br> correct [10] 28/12 45/1 45/23 50/12 51/18 <br> 52/12 54/24 58/4 58/12 72/12 <br> correctly [1] 44/24 <br> correctness [1] 27/21 <br> correspondence [1] 70/18 <br> could [36] 8/19 8/19 8/19 10/14 10/22 13/21 <br> 19/3 19/5 19/6 20/9 21/10 21/13 21/20 22/13 <br> 38/2 38/4 38/6 38/10 40/9 40/11 42/13 45/18 <br> 48/4 59/10 60/4 60/4 60/10 61/11 65/9 <br> couldn't [2] 36/9 57/22 <br> counsel [9] 4/6 4/21 5/3 5/7 5/13 34/6 38/15 <br> 64/13 71/22 <br> counseled [1] 29/12 <br> countering [1] 51/15 <br> counting [1] 39/25 <br> country [3] 23/7 27/18 63/8 <br> countryside [1] 62/1 <br> course [2] 37/6 59/19 <br> court [72] $1 / 1$ 3/6 4/2 5/16 5/23 7/7 7/7 <br> $\begin{array}{lllll}14 / 23 & 15 / 2 & 18 / 13 & 19 / 24 & 20 / 25 \\ 21 / 17 & 21 / 13 & 21 / 13 \\ 22 / 4 & 22 / 25 & 23 / 5 & 23 / 5 & 23 / 15 \\ 23 / 21\end{array}$ <br> $\begin{array}{ll}21 / 17 & 22 / 4 \\ 24 / 19 & 30 / 25 \\ 30 / 15 & 23 / 5 \\ 32 / 14 & 23 / 5 \\ 32 / 15 & 32 / 15 \\ 32 / 20 & 32 / 22\end{array}$ <br> $\begin{array}{ll}32 / 24 & 33 / 3 \\ 33 / 11 & 33 / 14 \\ 33 / 21 & 34 / 1 \\ 34 / 4\end{array}$ <br> 34/16 37/6 37/8 37/14 38/12 38/25 42/7 42/8 <br> 42/10 42/12 43/1 49/7 49/10 49/11 49/17 <br> 49/17 50/10 51/12 52/10 57/10 57/17 57/18 $57 / 1957 / 20$ 57/25 58/7 58/10 64/14 65/13 <br> 57/19 57/20 57/25 58/7 58/10 64/14 65/13 $65 / 16$ 65/18 69/1 69/7 70/7 72/3 72/4 72/8 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |




| G Case 1:07-cv-01532-EGS-J |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| glove [1] 62/23 | happy [3] 7/9 7/25 24/13 | HOWARD [2] 2/45/1 |
| gmail.com [1] 1/20 | hard [4] 12/16 38/1 69/20 70/7 | HSUS [7] 31/1 31/2 31/2 31/5 31/7 31/11 |
| go [34] 9/22 9/24 10/11 11/13 12/21 18/2 | harm [1] 14/4 | 70/19 |
| 2/111 23/18 24/13 26/1 31/6 31/9 32/20 | Harrisburg [1] 61/22 | huge [1] 30/10 |
| 32/25 37/9 37/20 45/12 45/21 46/11 47/3 | has [45] 5/23 7/13 9/3 9/6 11/4 13/13 13/13 | huh [1] 26/2 |
| 49/1 52/18 56/20 57/11 62/10 64/13 64/25 | 13/14 14/3 14/10 17/9 22/25 23/2 23/4 23/23 | humane [3] 2/12 5/10 62/16 |
| 65/5 65/17 67/2 67/6 67/21 69/14 70/14 | 25/23 26/4 29/12 30/15 30/16 32/17 34/12 | hundred [4] 39/10 40/10 40/13 54/11 |
| goalpost [1] 45/11 | 34/13 36/14 37/77 41/18 42/10 57/12 60/14 | hundreds [3] 14/2 25/13 63/5 |
| goes [9] 6/17 15/18 15/18 17/10 30/5 36/23 | 60/14 62/18864/1 65/4 65/5 66/19 68/16 69/2 | Huvelle [2] 27/15 29/22 |
| 60/7 66/4 68/21 | 69/21 70/13 71/1 71/5 71/5 71/6 71/10 71/12 | Huvelle's [1] 27/8 |
| going [60] 6/3 6/8 | hasn't [1] 38/9 | hypothetical [1] 46/24 |
| $\begin{array}{ll}17 / 13 & 17 / 23 \\ 32 / 10 & 32 / 14 \\ 32 / 15 & 30 / 10 \\ 32 / 16 & 33 / 20 \\ 319 & 33 / 2 \\ 32 & 34 / 9\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|l} \text { hate [1] 28/18 } \\ \text { have [118] } \end{array}$ | I |
| 34/14 34/16 35/5 37/8 37/18 39/9 42/3 42/19 | haven't [9] 18/6 35/7 35/12 41/22 66/8 66/8 | I'd [3] 23/18 38/20 38/23 |
| 42/20 46/7 47/3 48/25 49/14 52/15 54/13 | 66/14 66/17 71/16 | I'll [3] 7/9 7/11 34/8 |
| 55/13 55/17 59/16 59/16 60/16 60/17 64/23 | Havens [4] 20/8 20/15 56/6 56/9 | I'm [53] 4/11 4/18 4/24 4/25 5/4 6/16 618 |
| 64/25 64/25 65/23 65/25 66/1 66/2 66/3 | hcollyer [1] 3/5 | 7/10 7/25 15/15 17/13 19/10 19/11 22/20 |
| 66/18 66/22 67/21 69/17 70/1 70/6 70/7 70/7 | he [42] 6/25 25/14 27/6 27/12 31/1 31/18 | 23/4 23/6 24/17 26/8 29/13 29/18 34/16 |
| 70/11 71/18 | 31/18 44/4 48/10 48/22 52/24 52/24 53/3 | 34/17 37/8 38/19 41/25 42/5 45/24 45/24 |
| going to [1] 34/14 | 53/5 53/19 53/20 56/17 57/3 57/9 57/18 | 46/4 46/9 47/3 48/4 48/25 48/25 49/4 |
| good [20] 4/7 4/10 4/17 4/18 4/22 4/24 5/3 | 57/21 57/22 57/25 58/6 58/7 62/5 62/19 | 50/4 50/14 50/15 53/4 55/6 55/13 55/19 |
| 5/7 5/13 10/20 12/16 16/2 16/3 16/5 16/20 | 62/20 62/21 62/22 62/22 62/24 62/24 62/24 | 57/15 60/8 61/9 61/13 62/3 64/23 64/25 |
| 17/4 18/11 18/14 54/20 62/17 | 62/25 67/23 68/8 68/8 68/9 68/10 68/13 709 | 66/11 71/24 72/4 |
| gosh [1] 17/12 | He'd [1] 68/11 | I'm sorry [1] 6/16 |
| got [24] 8/22 11/19 15/24 16/5 21/8 22/9 | he's [5] 25/1 31/10 48/20 57/21 62/4 | I've [6] 7/4 10/9 29/8 29/9 29/10 36/11 |
| 22/10 25/1 31/9 42/3 44/12 45/3 45/3 46/14 | heading [1] 10/3 | idea [4] 46/1 47/4 50/3 62/18 |
| 55/24 58/7 58/22 59/14 63/23 65/2 65/5 | hear [2] 6/15 68/2 | identical [1] 23/20 |
| 66/14 67/3 69/14 | hearing [2] 1/8 26/8 | identified [1] 11/22 |
| gotten [3] 9/18 41/22 66/17 | heart [2] 6/17 36/23 | identify [1] 4/6 |
| grand [1] 68/14 | heck [1] 33/18 | identities [2] 63/15 63/15 |
| gratuities [1] 11/18 | heightened [1] $7 / 21$ | identity [1] 61/14 |
| gratuity [2] 13/7 13/8 | Heinous [1] 40/13 | II [1] $32 / 5$ |
| gray [1] 26/14 | Held [1] 10/4 | ill [1] 9/18 |
| great [6] $4 / 134 / 145 / 236 / 2462 / 162 / 1$ grew [1] Gis | $\begin{aligned} & \text { help [2] [15/13 63/24 } \\ & \text { Hemi [1] } 21 / 7 \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Greyhound [1] 61/3 ground [10] 11/11 22/23 23/8 23/22 24/6 | her [9] 27/20 27/20 61/13 61/17 62/8 62/15 | illustrated [1] 61/2 <br> image [3] 47/22 47/23 61/24 |
| 25/19 26/5 27/20 27/20 58/14 | here [40] 4/25 5/5 5/9 5/10 7/5 7/7 7/8 71 | immediately [1] $65 / 19$ |
| groundwork [1] 66/18 | 11/3 15/16 16/7 16/9 16/13 22/3 27/6 28 | impact [1] 30/10 |
| group [4] 6/11 6/12 21/7 72/1 | 3 30/4 31/6 31/16 33/16 33/20 34/1 | impacting [1] 29/4 |
| GTMO[2] 26/18 68/3 | 37/7 41/20 42/1 49/2 53/12 55/19 55/25 57/7 | impeded [1] 63/13 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Guantanamo [4] } \\ & \text { guess [4] } \\ & \text { 5/19 }\end{aligned}$ 26/123 29/15 37/23 68/9 68/13 | 58/17 59/7 59/14 61/9 61/9 65/24 67/3 69/9 $69 / 10$ | implausible [7] 16/7 49/3 49/6 55/1 55/7 55/10 55/15 |
| guidance [1] 36/12 | hers [1] 29/4 | important[11] 13/19 14/22 16/13 16/23 |
| guy [3] 31/17 57/9 68/6 | high [3] 26/12 26/15 27/22 | 30/12 30/13 30/14 30/14 33/9 69/5 69/8 |
| guy's [1] 56/24 | highly [1] 49/11 | impossible [6] 8/6 22/13 25/8 25/2 |
| H | Hill [1] 28/4 |  |
| H.J [2] 13/17 39/3 | him [11] 22/8 27/11 48/19 48/21 53/15 53/16 | INC [2] 1/24/4 |
| had [44] 4/11 4/12 4/144/15 5/21 10/21 | 8/2 67/24 | including [1] 17/8 |
| 14/19 17/16 19/15 19/24 20/9 20/9 20/15 | his [10] 12/5 25/1 31/2 31/6 47/23 56/1 | incompetent [1] 52/5 |
| 21/2 21/11 45/21 48/3 48/17 50/20 50/24 | 56/19 56/21 58/7 68/11 | inconvenience [1] 62/1 |
| 51/22 51/22 52/7 54/4 55/8 55/24 56/4 56/8 | history [1] 22/5 | incorrect [1] 50/4 |
| 56/11 56/15 56/20 58/9 58/11 58/18 59/2 | Hogan [1] 64/24 | incredibly [1] 38/1 |
| 59/10 60/10 66/8 66/11 66/13 66/14 67/19 | hold [2] 38/5 54/25 | incumbent [2] 18/13 18/14 |
| 71/1 71/2 | Holloway [1] 61/2 | incurred [1] 64/1 |
| hadn't [1] 58/15 | Holmes [2] 21/19 56/13 | indeed [3] 18/15 36/15 42/11 |
| HALE [2] $2 / 6$ 5/5 | Holzmann [1] 41/6 | index [1] $69 / 22$ |
| halloween [2] 7/5 19/12 | Honor [86] | indicated [1] 11/10 |
| hammered [1] $12 / 5$ | Honor's [6] 7/11 10/17 11/15 14/18 37/10 | indication [1] 62/17 |
| hand [4] 25/7 40/18 52/2 62/23 |  | individual [1] 58/9 |
| hand-in-glove [1] 62/23 | HONORABLE [1] $1 / 8$ | induced [1] 57/11 |
| Handeen [1] 25/15 | hooks [1] 63/2 | inevitable [1] 69/11 |
| handful [1] 71/23 | hope [1] 14/5 | inference [3] 59/25 63/863/ |
| handled [1] 61/1 | hopefully [1] 37/17 | inflate [1] 12/24 |
|  | hour [1] $6 / 14$ | information [7] 20/8 34/4 48/9 50/6 50/13 |
| happen [7] 28/4 28/4 43/3 47/25 64/17 65/2 $65 / 4$ | housing [1] 58/24 <br> how [28] 7/22 12/9 17/11 22/5 22/11 26/14 | $\begin{aligned} & 50 / 2570 / 22 \\ & \text { initial [3] 29/24 } 30 / 335 / 23 \end{aligned}$ |
| 54/17 54/21 57/11 63/13 68/1 68/18 68/18 | 33/6 33/20 35/15 43/7 43/8 46/15 46/16 | injured [4] 43/24 43/25 63/177 63/18 |


| I Case 1:07-cv-01532-EGS-J | Nune 3044 | 17913 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| injury [11] 8/7 21/9 21/20 25/7 43/23 51/23 | jurisdiction [5] 28/6 30/3 30/5 30/6 35/24 | leads [2] 55/21 55/21 |
| 51/23 56/19 58/18 59/3 64/1 | just [55] 4/11 4/16 8/11 10/7 10/9 13/18 | leaning [1] 71/18 |
| inside [1] 70/24 | 13/24 14/5 14/19 15/15 16/1 16/2 22/6 23/1 | learn [1] 27/9 |
| INSTITUTE [2] 3/3 5/18 | 24/3 26/17 27/24 29/13 29/22 30/11 33/14 | leases [1] 41/1 |
| instructed [1] 69/23 | 39/10 42/20 43/3 44/4 44/4 46/4 46/9 46/24 | least [4] 26/7 43/24 58/9 58/12 |
| instruments [1] 63/21 | 47/25 51/5 53/9 54/17 55/10 55/10 56/3 56/5 | leave [1] $6 / 2$ |
| insufficient [1] 7/23 | 56/9 57/17 58/19 60/25 61/23 63/4 64/7 66/1 | led [2] 62/5 62/20 |
| insurance [1] 40/12 | 66/2 66/23 67/4 67/20 69/24 70/3 70/14 | left [2] 27/11 31/17 |
| intended [2] 41/15 46/18 | 71/13 71/23 72/2 | legal [9] 13/7 21/14 42/23 48/17 53/2 56/11 |
| intention [1] 60/22 | justice [5] 11/7 45/21 58/21 68/15 69/3 | 65/8 65/12 65/16 |
| intentional [1] 31/7 | justices [2] 36/4 36/17 | legally [1] 52/7 |
| intently [1] 30/16 | justified [1] 30/7 | legitimate [1] 36/14 |
| interest [4] 30/15 45/18 68/21 69/9 | justify [1] 32/19 | Lemaire [1] 25/15 |
| interested [3] 34/12 46/6 50/4 | K | length [3] 11/1 11/14 12/1 |
| interpreted [1] 67/10 | Kara [2] 1/11 4/9 | let [8] 4/10 6/7 11/13 14/7 17/4 52/18 57/17 |
| interrogatories [1] 56/21 | KATHERINE [4] 2/3 5/1 47/14 62/2 | 66/9 |
| intersection [1] 34/14 | keeping [1] 4/16 | let's [3] 10/22 52/18 56/7 |
| introduce [1] 6/22 | Kennedy [2] 28/10 36/4 | letter [7] 47/13 53/6 53/12 61/21 62/2 62/9 |
| intrusive [1] 30/12 | Kerr [3] 3/6 72/11 72/15 | 62/12 |
| invading [1] 36/22 | Kessler [2] 28/25 64/17 | letters [4] 52/19 52/22 52/23 53/1 |
| invalid [2] 50/25 52/7 | Key [1] 39/12 | LEWIS [2] 2/12 5/10 |
| invitation [4] 16/14 16/24 17/5 47/12 | kidding [1] 65/22 | lie [1] 55/13 |
| invitations [1] 54/22 | kill [1] 40/12 | lied [2] 31/18 57/9 |
| invite [1] 6/9 | KIM [2] 2/7 5/5 | light [2] 22/3 30/18 |
| invoice [1] 13/4 | kind [5] 25/11 26/10 37/4 38/5 68/8 | like[28] $7 / 5$ 12/24 14/1 14/2 14/3 23/14 28/8 |
| involving [3] 28/3 29/16 29/17 | King [1] 3/3 | 30/11 48/7 50/9 54/1 58/13 58/13 63/5 63/20 |
| Iqbal [10] 7/17 7/20 8/22 15/24 25/20 48/7 | knew [9] 27/5 35/10 35/11 43/10 44/6 44/8 | 63/20 63/21 66/1 66/2 66/18 67/24 68/3 68/5 |
| 48/8 67/24 68/5 68/7 | 60/2 60/2 60/9 | 68/15 68/21 70/4 71/2 71/19 |
| Iqbal/Twombly [1] 15/24 | know [65] 6/6 6/8 6/17 6/17 6/18 6/25 12/9 | likely [4] 46/25 63/1 63/8 63/9 |
| irrelevant [3] 44/25 49/18 49/20 | 15/16 17/11 18/5 22/15 23/6 23/18 23/21 | line [4] 28/21 31/25 32/4 52/11 |
| IRS [2] 48/23 62/25 | 26/11 26/13 26/15 26/16 26/20 26/21 27/2 | link [1] $71 / 8$ |
| is [195] | 27/6 27/19 28/6 28/14 28/15 28/23 29/14 | linked [1] 70/13 |
| isn't [9] 11/8 23/25 24/23 25/2 43/2 49/6 | 31/22 33/1 33/13 33/23 33/25 34/11 34/13 | Liss [1] 53/9 |
| 49/25 55/17 67/21 | 34/15 35/3 35/10 43/15 44/6 44/21 46/5 | list [1] 53/1 |
| issuance [1] 5/24 | 47/16 47/17 48/2 48/18 48/24 54/10 54/18 | listened [2] 26/21 61/23 |
| issue [27] 8/4 8/14 14/24 22/10 22/18 23/4 | 56/10 56/19 57/15 58/8 59/18 61/10 61/11 | lists [1] 32/5 |
| 23/7 26/9 26/9 28/10 29/1 31/20 32/15 32/17 | 61/13 63/1 63/2 66/18 70/12 70/17 71/15 | literally [1] 18/8 |
| 37/4 37/17 41/24 42/8 42/12 46/4 52/8 60/4 | 71/15 71/16 | litigation [2] 22/20 25/12 |
| 61/9 61/9 65/12 65/23 69/17 | known [1] 55/9 | little [5] 16/6 25/17 29/20 41/25 70/5 |
| issues [23] 5/24 28/5 28/5 33/2 33/2 33/3 | knows [1] 61/5 | Litvinoff [2] $2 / 85 / 6$ |
| 33/9 33/10 33/16 36/15 36/21 37/5 37/18 | kpetteway [1] 1/15 | lived [1] 44/15 |
| 37/25 38/5 38/13 42/19 43/14 56/20 64/14 | L | livelihood [1] 9/9 |
| 65/8 65/16 69/14 | L | LLP [5] 1/21 2/7 2/12 2/15 2/19 |
| it [226] | L.L.P [1] 1/10 | Logan [2] 1/22 4/20 |
| It'd [2] 26/3 26/3 | labored [1] 26/20 | long [7] 4/15 32/4 39/15 39/20 39/22 40/15 |
| it's [119] | laced [1] 31/6 | 64/9 |
| it's making [1] 60/13 | lacking [3] 16/7 16/9 48/10 | long-term [3] 39/15 40/15 64/9 |
| itemization [1] 57/3 | Lamberth [1] 41/5 | look [15] 9/14 9/25 10/11 12/11 13/1 13/19 |
| its [6] 9/16 21/10 22/19 41/3 46/9 51/17 | land [1] 46/11 | 23/6 26/13 36/25 40/8 42/4 54/1 57/21 62/10 |
| itself [3] 39/5 44/15 45/23 | Lane [1] 1/19 | 66/18 |
| J | language [2] 17/5 58/1 | looked [2] 25/11 30/22 |
|  | large [3] 29/11 34/1 70/1 | Looking [1] 7/13 |
| JAWORSKI [1] 1/10 | last [4] 36/21 42/14 44/12 66/1 | looks [5] 11/18 12/1 12/2 12/24 14/1 |
| John [4] 1/11 4/7 38/25 47/19 | lasted [1] 39/22 | loosely [1] 49/4 |
| Johnson's [1] 61/2 | late [2] 14/15 64/20 | lose [3] 59/4 59/4 59/5 |
| join [3] 46/23 49/5 49/13 | later[7] 14/13 14/21 48/22 56/1 58/8 62/7 | lost [2] 52/8 59/20 |
| joined [1] 60/10 | 62/24 | lot [7] 8/4 13/17 28/2 28/3 33/18 38/9 70/12 |
| JON [2] 2/6 5/5 | LAUGHTER [1] 35/9 | LOVVORN [2] $2 / 65 / 5$ |
| jsimpson [1] 1/15 | laundering [4] 11/18 13/9 39/18 41/12 | lower [1] 25/23 |
| judge [25] 1/9 25/21 26/20 27/2 27/8 27/10 | Laura [2] 2/3 4/25 | lsmith [1] $1 / 25$ |
| 27/14 27/24 28/9 28/11 28/20 28/25 29/22 | laura.steel [1] $2 / 5$ | lunch [2] 6/14 71/25 |
| 34/13 39/11 39/11 41/5 51/5 53/6 58/21 | law [12] 1/18 14/11 22/18 45/6 45/18 46/17 | M |
| judges [1] 28/10 | lawfully [1] 22/4 | Madam [1] 41/9 |
| judgment [1] 31/18 | lawsuit [11] 17/10 21/15 36/24 44/15 48/19 | made [20] 7/19 14/15 32/23 33/24 45/20 |
| judicial [3] 14/18 34/21 35/24 | 49/5 60/10 60/24 63/19 63/23 68/22 | 47/13 48/13 55/9 57/10 57/17 57/18 57/19 |
| Judiciary [1] 35/20 | lawsuits [3] 14/3 25/14 56/11 | 57/21 57/25 58/21 59/24 60/4 61/23 62/20 |
| July [4] 5/25 8/12 10/2 11/10 | lawyer [4] 6/17 12/16 13/15 52/4 | 69/22 |
| July 2000 [1] 8/12 | lawyers [6] 12/15 12/22 31/15 31/15 31/16 | mail [6] 13/4 13/5 17/23 39/18 43/18 69/19 |



| 0 Case 1:07-cv-01532-EGS-J |  |  plan 22$] 389065 / 8$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| one... [8] 55/8 55/19 56/5 58/9 58/11 61/12 | 18/2 46/3 47/22 48/10 48/11 48/11 48/11 | plans [1] 38/10 |
| 63/4 69/14 | paragraphs [11] 7/15 7/20 8/1 8/15 8/17 9/6 | plausibility [4] 17/2 25/24 47/6 47/6 |
| ones [2] 30/11 46/14 | 9/21 10/1 10/3 10/19 16/9 | plausible [11] 9/14 15/25 15/25 16/5 18/19 |
| only [18] 36/20 36/20 39/4 41/2 41/17 43/1 | parameters [3] 32/13 34/2 34/3 | 47/9 48/15 48/17 48/23 49/1 68/17 |
| 43/9 46/17 46/20 47/12 50/4 57/13 57/14 | Pardo [2] 1/12 4/9 | plausibly [2] 8/22 10/12 |
| 62/13 63/13 68/1 68/18 71/24 | part [10] 9/11 9/16 19/3 20/11 20/13 23/24 | play [1] 61/7 |
| ONORATO [2] 2/19 5/15 | 24/2 67/21 70/1 70/12 | plead [4] 25/23 44/4 46/2 48/5 |
| open [4] 4/2 41/23 42/8 55/2 | part of [1] 70/12 | pleaded [3] 41/25 44/5 45/25 |
| open-ended [2] 41/23 42/8 | parted [1] 46/2 | pleading [14] 7/16 7/17 7/21 15/7 15/9 15/16 |
| opened [1] 38/9 | participants [1] 16/17 | 15/18 15/20 16/20 18/8 48/8 48/9 49/16 |
| operating [1] 43/22 | particular [1] 10/25 | 49/19 |
| Opinion [22] 5/25 7/20 10/17 11/10 11/16 | parties [6] 28/15 28/16 29/18 29/25 30/13 | pleadings [3] 10/18 36/4 37/21 |
| 12/6 14/12 14/15 19/15 20/2 22/23 23/1 23/2 | 38/3 | please[6] 4/3 4/6 38/25 59/17 63/21 63/24 |
| 23/8 23/15 24/7 25/19 26/6 27/1 28/9 50/23 | partner [1] 4/20 | pled [5] 17/18 17/18 18/4 18/6 37/2 |
| 61/2 | parts [2] 48/12 56/ | plenty [2] 45/3 45/3 |
| opinions [2] 28/9 3 | party [2] 16/11 61/5 | PLLC [1] 1/18 |
| opportunity [2] 17/2 35/7 | pass [2] 7/10 46/19 | plus [1] 39/23 |
| opposed [4] 23/1 47/7 47/8 54/15 | passed [1] 29/25 | podium [1] 6/10 |
| opposition [1] 53/7 | pattern [32] 7/13 8/2 8/7 10/23 11/11 12/24 | poignant [1] 20/13 |
| order [6] 4/4 37/10 43/21 54/1 61/16 65/23 | 14/2 14/4 14/21 22/18 25/14 26/9 26/9 37/3 | point [23] 10/20 14/1 19/11 23/14 27/18 |
| ordered [1] 51/11 | 39/4 39/6 39/7 39/10 39/13 39/19 39/22 | 29/22 36/3 42/10 47/5 48/3 49/5 50/17 53/23 |
| ordinarily [1] 17/23 | 39/24 40/10 40/14 40/20 40/24 41/19 41/23 | 54/19 56/3 57/12 58/11 61/20 65/11 66/6 |
| organization [5] 30/21 44/11 58/11 60/9 | 43/2 46/20 54/7 64/7 | 66/7 68/20 70/9 |
| 70/19 | PATTERSON [2] 2/15 5/11 | points [1] 71/24 |
| organizations [8] 9/18 13/5 17/16 30/20 | pay [10] 13/15 13/16 40/1 48/16 53/16 55/23 | policy [3] 67/24 68/14 68/17 |
| 31/14 31/16 53/2 62/23 | 62/4 62/21 62/24 70/23 | position [7] 32/12 37/20 37/22 38/8 59/12 |
| origin [1] 68/16 | paying [2] 48/19 48/20 | 60/20 64/14 |
| original [12] 9/25 9/25 10/1 10/4 10/7 10/11 | payment [7] 13/2 13/3 13/5 13/6 13/7 13/8 | positions [1] 27/23 |
| 11/23 11/24 41/4 43/9 44/21 51/25 | 40/4 | Posner [1] 25/21 |
| other [56] 8/10 8/11 8/11 8/20 9/2 14/24 | payments [3] 11/7 13/9 13/10 | possibility [4] 17/2 31/4 47/7 47/8 |
| 17/3 17/7 17/14 18/6 18/20 19/10 21/8 23/8 | pbwt.com [1] 2/18 | possible [8] 16/1 16/2 16/2 16/3 22/13 22/14 |
| 23/20 27/22 31/10 31/14 32/22 36/3 37/17 | pendent [1] 30/6 | 39/8 47/9 |
| 40/18 42/19 43/14 44/3 45/4 46/21 47/18 | pending [3] 37/24 38/6 56/1 | possibly [1] 47/25 |
| 49/1 50/16 53/10 53/17 54/1 54/4 54/4 55/2 | Pennslvania [1] 2/13 | poster [1] 18/8 |
| 55/17 55/18 55/20 56/13 57/4 58/11 60/22 | Pennsylvania [4] 1/13 2/8 61/22 | postponed [1] 66/14 |
| 61/14 62/23 63/7 63/14 64/14 65/6 67/2 67/3 | people [20] 17/13 23/9 23/10 40/13 45/4 | potential [3] 17/11 27/1 53/10 |
| 67/5 67/6 67/14 69/14 70/22 | 45/19 46/2 46/19 47/16 48/14 48/15 54/10 | precedent [3] 18/13 23/4 50/10 |
| others [2] 34/21 63/5 | 54/22 55/8 60/16 63/5 63/7 68/15 70/24 71/3 | precedential [1] 21/5 |
| otherwise [1] 35/25 | per [1] 13/16 | precise [1] 23/4 |
| ought [1] 64/16 | perfect [1] 35/7 | precisely [1] 69/2 |
| our [12] 8/2 10/18 11/24 16/15 25/22 27/15 | perfectly [1] 42/13 | preclude [1] 22/14 |
| 28/5 37/22 53/7 53/23 63/14 65/12 | perform [1] 52/23 | predecessor [1] 26/19 |
| out [36] 7/11 10/12 13/3 13/6 13/6 14/17 | performing [1] 53/2 | predicate [22] 11/19 12/2 12/5 12/12 12/23 |
| 15/15 16/24 17/10 18/9 19/13 21/25 22/2 | perhaps [2] 30/25 41/10 | 12/24 13/13 13/14 13/14 13/17 13/18 13/25 |
| 22/5 22/11 24/19 26/15 29/6 29/22 32/10 | period [3] 39/20 50/20 59/6 | 14/5 15/2 15/5 39/7 39/9 39/15 39/24 40/5 |
| 32/12 43/7 43/8 43/13 44/10 46/3 48/4 48/24 | peripheral [2] 37/1 37/2 | 40/11 64/5 |
| 54/22 55/14 56/25 57/6 57/13 58/19 59/19 | perjury [1] 58/3 | prejudice [2] 65/15 66/6 |
| 68/20 | permission [1] 49/13 | prejudices [1] 66/20 |
| outreach [1] 53/13 | perpetrate [1] 42/25 | prepared [1] 6/21 |
| over [20] 11/1 11/4 11/5 12/6 12/10 13/14 | perpetrated [1] 45/23 | preparing [1] 48/3 |
| 13/16 25/11 25/22 26/20 28/16 29/10 30/16 | perpetrators [8] 11/2 11/5 11/21 11/22 12/3 | presence [1] 12/20 |
| 31/6 31/16 39/20 50/3 53/1 53/11 60/5 | 47/1 49/23 60/24 | presented [2] 23/5 42/17 |
| overlooking [1] 36/7 | person [9] 43/3 54/11 54/11 55/3 62/12 | presents [1] 36/14 |
| overrule [2] 48/7 48/8 | 62/12 62/13 63/6 71/3 | pretty [9] 25/8 28/11 39/1 48/4 54/3 57/24 |
| overstated [1] 71/9 | person's [2] 23/15 61/19 | 61/13 62/11 62/17 |
| overwhelmingly [3] 8/8 25/9 37/1 | personal [2] 62/1 62/2 | prevailed [1] 42/11 |
| own [1] 51/6 | persuade [1] 23/21 | PREVENTION [3] 1/5 2/16 4/5 |
| owned [1] 41/3 | persuaded [1] 22/20 | principle [2] 49/21 60/25 |
| owner [1] 40/17 | Peter [2] 2/16 5/11 | private [3] 29/17 68/25 69/2 |
| $\mathbf{P}$ | petition [2] 19/18 67/22 | privilege [3] 38/2 38/5 70/2 |
|  | Petteway [2] 1/11 4/9 | privileges [1] 32/8 |
| P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S [1] 4/1 | Philip [2] 9/19 64/17 | probably [7] 12/10 14/19 29/4 29/9 33/5 |
| P.C [1] 3/2 | picked [1] 55/24 | 34/3 42/12 |
| p.m [3] 1/4 4/2 72/7 | PICKERING [1] $2 / 6$ | problem [5] 10/18 30/24 53/15 58/17 69/6 |
| page [1] 53/12 | piecemeal [1] 29/12 | proceedings [4] 3/9 29/23 30/2 72/12 |
| paid [10] 47/16 48/14 48/22 53/15 53/16 | pike [1] 33/22 | process [2] 40/13 44/20 |
| 53/20 54/4 57/9 62/22 62/25 | pit [1] 34/15 | produced [9] 3/9 34/2 44/13 61/14 61/15 |
| Palfrey [1] 41/8 | place [2] 46/1 68/1 | 62/10 71/2 71/5 71/6 |
| paper [1] 31/2 | plaintiff [11] 1/3 1/10 4/8 39/1 46/23 48/19 | professional [2] 70/20 70/20 |
| papers [2] 25/22 27/15 | 49/5 49/13 49/24 53/18 66/6 | professionally [1] 70/24 |


| P Case 1:07-cv-01532-EG | reading icunt | resore [5] 4qe 3 G/40 $33 / 91542 / 12$ 64/14 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| proffer [1] 71/10 | ready [1] 61/12 | resolved [2] 42/14 65/9 |
| progeny [1] 21/7 | real [1] $72 / 3$ | resort [1] 36/21 |
| PROJECT [2] 1/18 4/23 | reality [2] 60/14 60/15 | resorting [1] 33/11 |
| projected [1] 47/22 | realizing [1] 9/19 | resource [1] 51/1 |
| prolong [2] 44/17 44/18 | really [21] 6/16 6/16 6/19 10/12 12/4 12/20 | resources [4] 14/18 17/16 35/25 58/25 |
| proof [7] 9/24 19/18 19/20 19/25 52/8 56/9 | 22/16 23/13 23/13 23/21 26/12 30/20 30/24 | respect [10] 8/2 14/17 15/8 22/15 29/6 45/ |
| 59/4 | 31/24 36/22 39/23 41/15 45/11 55/16 69/6 | 50/5 69/18 69/19 69/19 |
| proper [3] 15/6 20/24 53/25 | 71/11 | respond [5] 6/3 6/9 6/25 37/11 71/22 |
| property [2] 8/18 10/6 | Realty [5] 20/8 20/16 56/6 56/9 58/20 | rest [2] $8 / 2145 / 22$ |
| propose [1] 52/13 | reason [11] 16/23 20/22 26/17 26/23 28/11 | result [10] 14/12 18/15 18/22 18/25 19/4 |
| proposed [1] 51/9 | 42/23 43/1 44/18 46/18 70/10 70/16 | 25/23 43/18 44/2 48/14 55/5 |
| proposition [2] 21/20 21/24 | reasonable [1] 23/9 | resurrected [1] 59/7 |
| prosecuted [1] 36/13 | reasonably [1] 17/25 | resurrecting [1] 59/8 |
| prosecution [2] 41/8 44/25 | reasons [5] 10/9 27/17 29/13 29/15 33/7 | reveal [2] 49/22 60/24 |
| prostitution [3] 41/10 41/11 41/12 | Rebecca [2] 1/12 4/9 | reversed [2] 30/4 42/3 |
| protective [1] 61/15 | recall [2] 29/9 35/1 | Reves [1] 70/4 |
| prototypical [1] 23/14 | receive [1] 40/2 | revised [1] 44/19 |
| protracted [1] 35/22 | received [1] 54/24 | RICO [32] 9/20 14/4 21/9 21/20 22/1 23/22 |
| prove [9] 20/25 21/1 21/11 21/12 52/13 | recently [1] 28/13 | 23/23 29/16 29/17 30/4 31/8 31/11 32/7 32/7 |
| 57/22 58/18 58/23 59/1 | recess [3] 38/18 72/6 72/7 | 32/19 36/6 36/8 36/13 36/19 36/20 39/14 |
| proved [1] 51/17 | recognize [5] 6/1 12/15 33/25 35/19 71/24 | 39/14 39/19 44/19 44/25 46/6 46/10 60/18 |
| proven [6] 20/9 20/19 51/1 51/2 51/3 52/10 | recognized [3] 8/5 8/8 10/10 | 66/25 68/22 68/23 69/2 |
| provide [2] 9/9 18/21 | recognizes [1] 35/21 | RIDER [40] 1/18 9/3 9/6 9/8 9/9 9/12 13/3 |
| provided [1] 10/15 | recognizing [1] 26/25 | 13/3 13/6 13/6 13/7 13/8 21/15 21/17 22/5 |
| public [10] 4/13 30/10 30/15 30/15 30/16 | reconsideration [7] 7/12 14/10 14/20 24/9 | 22/6 22/7 22/12 31/15 31/17 45/23 47/16 |
| 33/5 51/14 68/21 68/23 69/9 | 41/21 42/15 56/7 | 47/23 47/23 48/13 52/23 54/12 55/9 55/23 |
| public's [1] 33/4 | record [5] 4/6 19/24 29/25 61/18 72/12 | 56/16 56/17 57/6 57/14 60/9 61/23 61/25 |
| pull [1] 26/13 | recorded [1] 3/9 | 62/3 63/10 71/4 71/7 |
| pulled [1] 26/14 | records [2] 30/21 70/14 | Rider's [2] 22/6 56/12 |
| purely [1] 65/12 | redacted [5] 47/17 62/8 62/11 63/15 63/16 | ridiculous [3] 46/20 46/22 55/11 |
| purpose [1] 53/25 | reference [2] 32/11 47/13 | right [57] 4/10 4/21 5/3 5/7 5/13 5/16 5/19 |
| purposes [3] 10/19 54/4 56/8 | referenced [1] 8/15 | 6/24 7/2 7/6 10/2 10/23 15/1 15/23 18/18 |
| pursue [4] 50/1 50/2 54/7 58/22 | references [1] 10/17 | 19/22 20/21 21/3 21/3 23/2 24/10 24/12 |
| pursued [1] 59/11 | referencing [1] 7/14 | 24/14 24/20 24/20 26/16 26/17 26/23 26/23 |
| put [6] 14/24 38/14 52/3 57/22 61/17 65/12 | refocused [1] 13/21 | 27/12 27/17 27/18 35/17 35/17 36/2 36/2 |
| puts [1] 60/7 | refunds [1] 27/19 | 36/15 36/18 36/18 37/7 37/24 38/12 38/15 |
| pwtomlinson [1] 2/18 | regardless [1] 42/8 | 38/20 48/4 50/9 50/16 50/18 58/2 64/20 |
| Q | regime [1] 15/21 <br> regular [1] 62/14 | 64/22 66/10 66/16 69/6 71/5 71/21 72/5 |
| question [18] 6/3 6/4 10/21 14/6 22/18 22/22 | rehearing [2] 19/18 52/14 | $\operatorname{road}[3] \quad 32 / 2546 / 747 / 3$ |
| 30/3 30/5 30/9 35/5 35/23 39/12 41/22 50/16 | related [2] 64/9 71/6 | Roger [2] 1/22 4/19 |
| 56/4 56/6 64/25 69/23 | relates [1] 21/6 | Rogers [1] 39/11 |
| questioning [1] 52/4 | relatively [1] $25 / 20$ | Rogers' [1] 53/13 |
| questions [12] 5/25 6/5 6/9 6/10 7/1 7/9 7/11 | relied [1] 52/21 | Room [1] 3/7 |
| 19/10 38/21 38/22 38/22 38/24 | rely [1] 22/25 | Rothstein [2] 27/24 28/11 |
| quick [2] 27/12 72/3 | remain [1] $4 / 3$ |  |
| quickest [1] 27/6 | remains [2] 28/21 33/15 | Rule [7] 7/21 16/20 38/13 48/6 48/6 48/6 |
| quickly [2] 37/9 38/14 | remand [1] 32/21 | 66/14 |
| quite [1] 11/18 | remanded [2] 19/20 42/12 | ruled [2] 50/19 61/4 |
| $\begin{array}{lllllllllll}\text { quote [4] } & 17 / 25 & 18 / 3 & 18 / 3 & 29 / 23 \\ \text { quoting [1] } & 60 / 8\end{array}$ | remedies [1] 30/7 | ruling [5] $8 / 3$ 14/21 19/19 20/14 30/4 run [2] 58/15 58/16 |
| R | remember [4] 9/16 22/6 37/7 51/23 | runaround [1] 66/21 |
| ```racketeer [1] 31/11 racketeering [16] 11/4 39/4 39/6 39/13 40/10 40/14 40/20 40/25 41/19 41/23 43/2 64/2 64/3 64/8 70/5 71/8 raise [12] 8/14 9/7 10/13 10/20 42/10 44/11 44/18 48/1 60/3 64/2 70/17 70/25 raised [8] 9/5 9/8 14/20 18/22 18/25 19/3 51/11 61/4 raising [1] 63/18 rally [3] 61/22 62/6 63/9 rare [1] 40/19 rarely [1] 23/11 rather [1] 28/16 rbasan [1] 1/16 \(\operatorname{Re}[1] 25 / 21\) reach [3] 26/16 26/22 32/1 reached [2] 41/24 66/7``` | reminding [1] 35/11 | rushing [1] 24/17 |
|  | repeating [2] 38/21 38/2 |  |
|  | reply [2] 31/1 37/11 | S |
|  | report [1] 35/20 | sacrifice [1] 62/2 |
|  | reporter [3] 3/6 72/4 72/10 | said [32] 10/22 12/6 12/7 12/10 15/13 18/25 |
|  | REPORTERS [1] 72/8 | 20/6 20/25 23/15 25/22 26/7 27/21 28/12 |
|  | reports [1] 70/21 | 34/13 34/20 36/9 36/10 36/10 42/1 42/3 |
|  | represent [1] 16/20 | 42/18 44/4 47/21 48/18 51/16 57/21 59/15 |
|  | representations [2] 18/16 19/4 | 62/5 62/15 63/10 64/23 68/3 |
|  | representing [1] 6/2 | salary [1] 62/19 |
|  | request [3] 8/2 9/16 42/19 | same [18] 10/2 12/1 12/2 14/25 28/10 42/4 |
|  | requested [1] 29/10 | 49/24 54/13 59/14 62/8 62/11 62/12 62/13 |
|  | requests [3] 29/16 33/23 33/24 | 62/21 63/5 63/7 63/9 63/18 |
|  | require [2] 64/15 65/9 | sanction [2] 67/2 67/4 |
|  | required [4] 34/2 45/2 45/6 48/6 | sanctions [2] 67/1 67/6 |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { requirements [1] 7/21 } \\ & \text { reserving [1] 35/21 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { satisfied [1] } 39 / 24 \\ & \text { saw [1] 33/15 } \end{aligned}$ |


| S Case 1: |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| saw that [1] 33/15 | side [2] 23/2 69/10 | stage [6] 15/16 15/18 15/20 49/16 49/19 53/2 |
| say [36] 12/12 13/17 16/25 17/1 17/21 20/15 | side-track [1] 69/10 | stakes [3] 26/12 26/15 27/22 |
| 21/2 21/8 23/6 24/7 28/7 29/10 31/13 32/20 | sides [3] 6/1 23/10 25/11 | stand [3] 21/19 21/23 21/24 |
| 36/836/9 37/8 39/12 46/17 47/19 48/21 | sideshow [1] 42/20 | standard [6] 15/22 25/9 33/13 |
| 48/24 50/21 51/19 57/17 60/8 60/11 60/17 | signature [1] 62/11 | 55/1 |
| 62/17 63/1 63/1 65/12 66/22 67/15 70/14 | signed [3] 16/20 62/12 62/12 | standards [1] 25/24 |
| 71/13 ${ }_{\text {l }}$ | significance [1] 14/14 | standing [37] 19/15 20/5 20/7 20/8 20/9 |
| saying [13] 16/17 25/7 25/9 25/10 45/24 | significant [4] 28/16 29/16 30/12 33/16 | 20/16 20/23 21/2 21/4 21/10 22/7 31/17 |
| 45/24 46/14 60/3 62/3 63/19 63/22 63/23 | similar [2] 11/18 23/20 | 41/18 50/17 50/20 50/2 |
| 65/22 | simply [7] 21/6 41/16 42/ | 51/22 56/8 56/13 56/19 57/1 57/6 57/1 |
| says [17] 10/4 12/12 13/17 17/7 17/24 25/12 | 60/23 63/19 | 57/14 58/10 58/11 59/5 59/16 59 |
| 25/14 25/21 29/22 31/1 34/11 47/22 48/10 | Simpson [16] 1/11 4/8 12/4 12/7 12/15 17/14 | 60/1 60/10 70/4 71/24 |
| 53/12 55/11 55/11 57/24 | 20/23 25/4 25/10 25/12 30/7 31/17 37/11 | starkly [1] 30/25 |
| scales [3] 24/22 25/2 35/8 | 38/1 38/20 38/25 | start [2] 27/24 28/6 |
| scam [1] 40/12 | Simpson's [1] 31/1 | started [3] 33/12 43/7 43/8 |
| schedules [1] 6/18 | since [2] 5/25 51/7 | starting [1] 32/5 |
|  | single [21] 8/6 8/6 8/7 8/9 12/23 13/2 13/23 | starts [2] 28/8 66/6 |
| scheme [28] 8/6 8/9 8/1118158 8/19 8/23 8/24 | 13/25 16/11 17/18 18/5 18/6 25/7 25/7 25/18 | state [3] 19/15 30/8 44/6 |
| 9/11 9/14 9/22 9/23 10/5 10/8 10/13 11/12 | 39/6 40/15 40/20 41/5 55/3 66/8 | stated [2] 48/10 64/24 |
| 11/14 13/23 15/13 17/24 18/4 24/625/7 | situation [5] 44/7 53/24 54/9 54/9 55/22 | statement [5] 16/25 17/1 17/3 54/12 62/20 |
| 25/18 41/5 45/22 54/14 63/17 63/18 | six [7] 6/3 10/24 11/9 12/11 56/2 65/3 66/7 | statement's [1] 17/1 |
|  | sixth [1] 66/5 | statements [6] 16/22 17/20 47/11 47/15 |
| scheming [1] 31/8 | slightly [1] 57/23 | 48/13 57/25 ${ }^{\text {STATES [8] }} 11192125 / 10$ |
| SCHERTLER [2] 2/19 5/1 | smile [1] $25 / 1$ | $\underset{\text { STATES [8] }}{69 / 2} \mathbf{1 / 1} 1 / 9$ 2/12 5/10 40/1 41/7 |
| schertlerlaw.com [1] $2 / 22$ <br> scope [1] 29/1 | $\begin{aligned} & \operatorname{Smith}[2] 1 / 224 / 2 \\ & \operatorname{smooth}[1] \\ & 6 / 21 \end{aligned}$ | 69/2 69/4 statute [4] 39/5 46/11 57/16 64/10 |
| Scott [2] 2/85/6 | so [78] | statutory [1] 34/15 |
| scott.litvinoff [1] 2/10 | so-called [1] 41/9 | stay [5] 37/14 59/21 59/23 65/19 |
| scrutinized [2] 8/9 28/10 | SOCIETY [5] 1/5 2/12 2/15 4/5 5/10 | stayed [3] 44/9 99/22 66/3 |
| sealed [3] 4/1433/4 33/7 | solely [1] $21 / 21$ | Steel [3] 2/3 4/25 67/3 |
|  | solicitation [3] 16/12 18/10 18/10 | stenography [1] 3/9 |
| second [19] 8/14 8/23 8/24 9/11 9/14 9/22 | solicitations [2] 43/20 44/12 | STEPHEN [3] <br> Steve [1] 622 <br> $1 / 181 / 18$ <br> $1 / 22$ |
| 10/13 10/21 11/11 11/12 15/13 22/10 22/22 | solicitors [1] 70/20 | Steve [1] 6/22 Stevens [1] $28 / 1$ |
| 23/3 24/6 29/3 30/1 $52 / 1956 / 5$ security [1] 33/2 | some [26] 4/12 6/5 6/7 18/10 19/10 27/2 27/3 27/3 34/3 34/13 37/18 38/21 39/25 42/6 43/2 | Stevens [1] 28/1 sticks [1] 50/14 |
| see [11] 13/2 15/19 23/7 26/14 28/24 28/24 | 51/1 51/4 53/25 56/11 57/12 58/19 61/11 | still [14] 7/23 10/14 10/23 21/17 25/20 2 |
| 30/22 37/14 37/16 44/15 70/9 | 65/6 66/5 67/2 | 52/8 57/11 57/8 57/9 57/9 57/16 59/5 71/16 |
| seek [3] 47/24 67/6 67/7 | somebody [9] 13/15 17/3 18/10 18/17 24/18 | stood [1] 27/20 |
| seem [2] 29/18 34/5 <br> seems [5] 7/19 11/3 22/13 33/20 65/2 | 47/2 47/2 $48 / 25$ 61/13 | ( $\begin{aligned} & \text { stopped [1] } 49 / 22 \\ & \text { story [1] 59/6 }\end{aligned}$ |
| seems [5] $71911 / 3$ | somehow [1] 7/23 | story [1] 59/6 Street [4] $1 / 232 / 42 / 203 / 3$ |
| selfless [1] $61 / 25$ | someone's [1] 69/19 | strength [2] 48/1 64/2 |
| seminal [1] 9/4 | something [11] 14/1 14/3 24/17 29/19 32/2 | strive [2] 26/16 26/22 |
| senators [1] 28/7 | 53/17 54/1 63/11 63/13 65/13 67/25 | strongly [1] $62 / 5$ |
| send [4] 26/24 33/14 63/24 71/3 | soon [1] 65/22 | stuff [5] 22/5 22/6 44/14 57/14 67/23 |
| sending [2] 30/7 48/21 | sooner [1] 65/19 | subject [2] 61/1 |
| sense [1] 55/12 | sorry [11] 4/10 4/11 4/15 4/16 6/16 6/1 | submit [5] 37/12 41/18 51/12 53/17 56/22 |
| sensitive [1] 31/23 <br> sent [6] 18/9 53/9 53/21 54/22 58/6 71/2 | 7/10 19/10 19/11 61/9 66/11 | $\begin{array}{lll}\text { submitted [2] } & 16 / 14 \text { 51/8 } \\ \text { subsidiary [1] } & 41 / 3\end{array}$ |
| separate [8] 22/1 $22 / 5$ 22/11 38/21 40/2 40/3 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { sort [3] 21/2425/3/3 } \\ & \text { sought [1] } 52 / 15 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{lll}\text { subsidiary [1] } & 41 / 3 \\ \text { substantial [4] } & 22 / 23 & 23 / 8 \\ 23 / 22 & 26\end{array}$ |
| 49/9 56/11 | sound [1] 46/6 | such [7] 14/16 19/25 39/19 51/13 68/17 |
| seriously [6] 24/14 31/22 32/20 39/23 41/15 | source [1] 9/7 | 70/19 71/1 |
| 46/25 | Souter [1] 36/5 | sue [3] 50/20 51/24 51/25 |
| Services [1] $27 / 14$ | South [1] 2/20 | sufficiency [5] 10/18 15/3 15/5 15/9 32/1 |
| set [4] 40/11 46/3 47/12 55/19 | SPAEDER [1] $1 / 2$ | sufficient [4] 19/4 19/16 32/21 45/17 |
| sets [1] 18/9 <br> seven [4] 13/9 13/12 37/11 $37 / 1$ | Spann [1] 58/20 | sufficiently [1] 64/8 |
| several [3] 11/5 17/9 29/23 sever | speak [2] 6/2] 6/11 32/16 speaking | $\begin{aligned} & \text { suggest [1] } 49 / 23 \\ & \text { suing [1] } 63 / 23 \end{aligned}$ |
| she [20] 27/17 27/20 27/20 27/20 27/21 | specific [2] 57/7 69/18 | Suite [5] 1/13 1/23 2/4 2/20 3/3 |
| 27/23 29/1 29/2 29/5 53/12 61/4 61/21 61/24 | specifically [2] 34/19 44/5 | SULLIVAN [1] $1 / 8$ |
| 62/2 62/5 62/13 64/23 67/8 67/9 67/19 she's [2] $28 / 12$ 29/5 | speculate [2] 44/5 52/10 | sum [1] 28/16 sums [2] 27/19 29/16 |
| sheer [1] 44/1 | speculation [4] speculative [1] $63 / 12$ | supplemental [2] 11/25 30/5 |
| shift [1] $67 / 7$ | speech [4] 27/25 28/1 28/2 61/23 | supported [1] 20/10 |
| ship [1] 71/19 | spend [3] 46/12 56/11 56/15 | supposed [2] 47/18 72/4 |
| - $\begin{aligned} & \text { short [2] 38/18 72/6 } \\ & \text { should [20] 8/12 19/20 22/25 29/15 32/1 }\end{aligned}$ | spending [2] 62/18 62/19 | supposedly [1] 71/11 |
| should [20] 8/12 19/20 22/25 29/15 32/1 33/20 34/7 34/8 35/6 36/6 36/20 36/20 37/4 42/7 42/12 50/1 50/1 58/9 61/1 65/13 show [2] 48/463/14 | spent [7] 5/23 51/15 54/3 56/16 56/17 57/4 58/25 <br> split [1] 25/17 | Supreme [6] 18/13 23/15 34/1 39/2 50/10 69/1 <br> sure [8] 15/8 15/8 24/17 48/5 50/14 50/15 <br> 57/15 $62 / 6$ |


| S Case 1:07 | 50/16 002, |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| survive [2] 7/20 43/12 | 69/25 70/18 70/21 71/8 71/10 | transportation [1] 4/13 |
| suspect [1] 60/8 | thereby [1] $12 / 24$ | travel [1] 41/11 |
| switch [3] 37/7 72/3 72/8 system [1] $69 / 7$ | these [34] 5/23 8/1 10/18 10/19 15/17 16/2 | traveling [1] 61/25 |
| T | 28/23 30/19 31/3 33/1 36/21 40/6 40/6 41/3 | treat [6] 7/6 7/7 12/19 12/20 19/12 25/5 |
| take [9] 13/12 37/9 37/15 37/16 38/11 38/17 | 43/14 45/19 46/23 55/8 55/18 55/20 $62 / 23$ 63/18 65/6 69/10 69/11 69/14 | trial [16] 6/17 14/21 19/16 20/20 21/11 5 |
| 43/19 56/24 72/5 | they [150] | 51/12 52/4 53/23 |
| taken [7] 27/22 36/11 39/12 41/14 60/4 66/8 | they'd [2] 24/16 24/16 | 64/22 64/23 68/1 |
|  | they're [35] 10/8 18/4 18/5 18/5 18/5 25/20 | trick [2] 7/5 25/5 |
| takes [2] 31/18 32/17 | 26/17 26/24 28/5 30/14 30/14 31/5 33/7 37/1 | tried [2] 12/8 13/21 |
| taking [1] 6/14 | 37/2 37/2 43/25 46/14 54/25 55/17 60/17 | trouble [2] 28/20 28/20 |
| takk [2] 17/23 36/22 | 62/18 62/19 63/18 63/19 63/22 63/22 63/24 | troubled [9] 23/626/9 26/11 26/19 27/6 27/9 |
| taked [4] 11/12 15/14 24/3 30/11 | 65/22 65/22 66/2 66/10 66/22 70/1 70/6 | 27/17 29/13 29/13 |
| talking [15] 7/17 27/19 30/3 34/19 41/20 | they've [3] 15/6 49/24 51/7 | troubling [12] 26/16 26/18 26/18 26/19 |
| 46/5 49/2 51/77 55/6 57/20 63/11 63/12 63/12 | thing [9] 16/25 39/5 43/10 44/3 63/13 69/14 | 26/22 27/2 27/3 27/4 28/5 28/21 32/10 33/9 |
| targeted [1] 55/24 | $\begin{array}{ll}\text { 69/ns [9] } \\ \text { thing [9]/14 25/12 } & \text { 28/3 28/7 37/15 37/23 }\end{array}$ | trumps [2] 36/8 36/19 |
| task [2] 6/13 34/23 | 42/21 57/6 65/6 | truth [2] 55/9 55/15 |
| Tatel [1] 51/5 | think [59] 6/22 13/20 14/17 17/22 31/24 | try [2] 10/11 43/21 |
| tax [1] 48/21 | 32/11 38/1 39/1 41/9 41/14 41/15 42/13 | trying [11] 10/8 13/22 15/15 19/12 22/11 |
| taxes [1] 48/20 | 43/13 45/11 46/22 49/3 49/9 49/10 49/11 | 31/10 44/17 44/17 46/9 54/25 55/25 |
| Ted [1] 28/1 | 49/18 50/11 50/12 50/16 52/5 52/6 52/9 | turn [1] 50/3 |
| tell [8] 7/24 13/11 17/15 23/19 29/9 34/9 | 52/16 52/17 53/8 54/8 54/18 55/15 57/19 | turns [2] 43/13 59/19 |
| 34/12 66/22 | 57/24 59/9 59/22 60/13 61/2 62/25 63/4 | two [11] 8/1 10/9 11/11 23/10 25/12 28/10 |
| telling [2] 17/22 55/19 | 64/116 65/6 65/7 66/6 66/21 67/8 68/10 68/13 | 39/9 40/11 40/12 40/22 46/16 |
| ten [6] 13/16 14/13 37/10 56/1 57/11 72/6 | 69/15 69/15 69/16 69/17 69/20 69/25 70/6 | two-thousand-and [1] 40/22 |
| ten-minute [1] 72/6 | 70/10 71/4 71/9 71/10 | Twombly [12] 7/17 7/20 8/22 15/24 16/4 |
| term [3] 39/15 40/15 64/9 | thinks [2] 38/1 67/23 | 18/9 18/19 25/20 31/4 31/10 48/7 48/8 |
| terms [2] 25/18 50/20 test [6] 10/24 11/10 12/11 $15 / 25$ 40/6 57/22 | third [2] 16/11 22/17 | TYLER [1] 2/15 |
| testimony [1] 69/18 | this [202] | types [1] 70/22 |
| text [2] 17/6 25/21 | thoroughly [1] $6 / 6$ | typeset [1] 10/3 |
| than [13] 13/13 13/14 15/21 18/20 23/8 | those [36] 7/20 8/1 8/12 8/14 8/15 8/17 8/23 | typical [1] 29/21 |
| 33/10 39/3 40/5 42/22 45/3 46/13 47/9 54/1 | 9/21 10/310/12 10/15 10/19 10/25 11/12 | U |
| 38/15 388/16 62/7 62/8 63/671/21 | 36/16 37/5 38/9 38/21 38/22 40/3 48/12 | U.S [1] 3/6 |
| that [422] | 48/12 48/23 48/24 499/4 52/18 52/21 52/22 | U.S.A [1] 5/15 |
| that's [116] | 63/21 | ultimate [1] 22/20 |
| their [18] 9/18 13/16 15/6 18/88 43/20 44/1 | though [18] 17/21 20/5 20/12 21/20 22/8 | ultimately [3] 51/2 69/17 69/25 |
| 44/16 45/18 46/2 50/3 51/6 52/2 55/16 55/25 | 24/14 26/24 27/10 31/6 36/12 40/16 42/9 | unavoidable [1] 4/16 |
| 63/15 63/15 64/2 70/4 | 44/23 47/10 49/16 51/20 53/15 61/9 | unaware [1] 59/1 |
| them [22] 6/2 11/13 12/8 17/15 19/2 31/12 33/10 33/11 47/19 48/2 50/8 51/11 55/20 | thought [6] 7/19 14/23 27/23 42/6 42/10 | uncertain [1] 50/19 <br> under [29] 7/218/5 8/22 9/20 10/23 |
| 55/20 59/10 60/21 61/11 63/2 63/3 63/23 | thousand [4] 11/4 12/6 12/10 40/2 | 15/21 15/22 15/24 16/4 16/20 18/13 1819 |
| 67/2 67/4 | threat [2] 14/3 14/4 | 30/5 31/4 31/10 39/5 39/14 39/14 39/1 |
| themselves [1] 39/16 | threaten [1] 29/23 | 40/6 40/6 46/10 48/6 56/8 56/13 57/9 67/ |
| then [41] 4/14 5/25 8/9 14/24 16/4 16/8 18/2 | three [5] 11/2 22/19 62/7 62/14 63/7 | understand [3] 6/6 14/14 44/24 |
| 18/16 19/4 21/3 21/4 21/14 22/1 24/6 24/8 | through [12] 8/16 8/25 11/13 13/1 16/10 | unfair [1] 54/18 |
| 24/9 24/16 25/14 31/2 31/5 31/13 31/15 35/3 | 21/11 43/1 44/10 44/15 45/12 45/21 57/24 | unique [1] 14/22 |
|  | throughout [3] 21/14 22/4 27/18 | UNITED [8] 1/1 1/9 2/12 5/10 40/1 41/7 |
| 45/8 45/23 54/13 55/14 58/15 58/21 65/16 67/3 69/8 69/13 69/21 | time [19] 5/21 5/22 5/23 6/1411/114/18 | 69/1 69/4 |
| 6/ theory [20] 20/7 $20 / 8$ 20/8 20/10 20/23 20/24 | 14/25 26/1 33/8 35/24 39/20 46/12 50/15 $51 / 25$ 59/14 66/1 66/23 69/3 69/10 | unjustly [4] 8/18 8/24 9/11 9/12 |
| 21/11 21/1221/14 21/18 50/25 51/1 51/6 | timeframe [1] 62/22 |  |
| 51/7 52/6 53/4 54/7 54/9 58/22 68/11 theory's [1] $21 / 1$ | times [3] 13/9 13/12 26/7 | $\left\lvert\, \begin{array}{ll} 21 / 22 \\ \text { unleash [1] } & 30 / 20 \end{array}\right.$ |
| there[56] 5/20 6/1 8/1 10/7 11/22 14/10 | tobacco [1] 28/25 | unless [6] 21/21 29/18 38/23 49/14 53/4 |
| 17/17 19/18 19/19 22/21 22/23 23/6 23/10 | today [2] 4/8 12/20 | unlikely [1] 49/11 |
| 23/21 24/8 24/25 25/17 27/1 27/17 32/11 | together [3] 8/22 8/23 64/4 | unnamed [1] 71/3 |
| 33/14 33/16 33/23 33/23 34/1134/3 34/10 | told [5] 48/23 62/24 66/1 66/2 66/24 | unnecessary [1] 58/10 |
| 37/15 37/17 37/19 37/23 38/11 39/25 41/2 | TOM [12] 1/18 9/3 9/6 27/5 27/645/23 | until [3] 28/8 69/17 69/23 |
| 42/19 43/14 46/21 49/25 51/13 51/14 51/23 54/21 55/16 56/18 57/6 58/9 58/23 59/18 | 47/16 55/23 61/23 61/24 71/4 71/7 | untruthful [1] 58/1 |
| 59/23 63/4 63/5 65/8 66/24 68/17 70/14 71/10 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { too [2] } 4 / 1521 / 25 \\ & \text { took [8] } 4 / 15 \text { 27/16 28/13 29/3 36/10 46/1 } \end{aligned}$ | up [23] 5/24 15/21 24/25 26/13 26/24 28/8 33/14 35/2 35/13 35/20 49/10 49/11 51/5 |
| there's [45] 10/16 13/16 15/4 16/25 17/17 17/17 17/18 17/18 20/24 21/8 24/6 24/8 25/17 25/19 25/22 26/5 33/25 34/13 34/18 | 58/8 68/1 tort [1] 39/14 totally [1] 63/11 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 51/8 51/9 51/10 59/11 65/13 67/3 67/467/9 } \\ & 67 / 2370 / 9 \\ & \text { upon [2] } 32 / 2154 / 23 \\ & \text { unctainc } 12115 / 1012 / 21211 \end{aligned}$ |


| Case 1:07- | we'll 1 Ps 9 Hment 134 Filed 02 | $32 / 18$ 32/18 33/16 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| us [7] 6/15 14/25 28/20 37/13 63/22 63/24 | we're[34] 7/16 15/16 15/17 15/20 15/24 | 3 34/3 53/14 |
| use [4] 14/18 28/18 63/21 70/19 | 48/18 48/19 48/20 49/2 52/15 59/16 63/11 | ing [2] 45/8 45/15 |
| used [7] 5/22 15/22 44/11 47/24 58/1 58/5 | 63/12 63/12 63/23 64/25 65/25 65/25 66/3 | WILMER [2] 2/6 5/5 |
| $\text { useful [1] } 44 / 18$ | we've [8] 11/12 45/3 45/3 46/5 47/21 63/23 | $1 / 2$ |
| using [4] 48/18 49/4 61/19 63/25 |  | [1] |
| V | WEBB [1] $2 / 15$ | [5] 24/9 59/16 66/1 66/2 66/ |
|  |  |  |
|  | [1] 6 | 43/24 49/12 61/19 62/4 62/21 |
|  | weeks [1] | 4/3 71/7 |
|  | weigh [2] 28/1 | witness [5] 11/7 39/17 53/18 53/24 56/18 |
|  | weight [1] 33/20 | woman [2] 61/21 62/25 |
|  | Weiss [2] 14/2 | wonderful [1] 71/4 |
|  | Weissman [2] 2 | wondering [1] 25/4 |
|  | WELFARE [2] | Woodbridge [1] $1 / 19$ |
|  | well [36] 7/6 7/20 14/24 14/24 | Woods [1] 1/19 |
|  | 17/15 26/25 28/9 30/14 31/3 31/13 32/12 | word [4] 28/18 28/19 49/4 |
|  | 32/13 32/21 33/3 34/10 36/10 37/2 38/12 | words [1] 55/2 |
|  | 39/2 42/5 42/14 50/8 50/11 51/16 54/21 | work [11] 10/9 31/4 |
|  | 57/23 58/2 58/13 58/15 60/13 60/20 62/10 | 53/4 53/16 53/19 62/16 |
|  | 68/5 69/9 | worked [1] 27/10 |
|  | went [15] 9/5 9/ | working [6] 12/16 30/1 62/4 62/21 62/23 |
|  | 43/5 45/4 48/16 54/10 61/21 62/6 63/9 | 62/24 |
|  | were [30] 9/8 11/2 11/22 14/22 27/3 27/3 | works [4] 20/24 52/17 52/17 70/25 |
|  | 27/17 31/14 31/15 35/5 40/24 42/1 42/13 | world [2] 25/11 29/4 |
|  | 44/17 48/13 48/16 54/22 57/6 57/25 59/1 | worry [1] 67/18 |
|  | 59/12 59/13 59/25 60/2 61/3 63/15 63/1 | worse [1] 63/2 |
|  | 64/22 65/18 66/24 | would [53] 4/6 4/13 10/21 10/23 14/20 16/16 |
|  | weren't [4] 27/3 43/8 44/17 70/3 | 16/18 16/19 17/22 21/11 21/17 22/11 23/16 |
|  | Western [16] 8/5 10/10 10/15 10/23 11/16 | 23/21 24/11 24/18 24/19 27/7 27/13 30/6 |
|  | 11/22 12/1 12/3 13/13 13/22 24/7 25/6 25/16 | 32/12 32/16 32/20 32/24 33/5 33/13 35/10 |
|  | 39/1 39/11 40/23 | 37/22 39/24 41/17 42/11 44/16 45/11 46/8 |
|  | what [103] | 46/12 46/23 48/24 49/5 55/9 56/10 56/15 |
|  | what's [15] 14/14 15/15 16/7 16/9 16/18 | 56/17 56/22 57/1 57/23 60/8 60/8 60/18 |
|  | 16/18 21/4 21/5 21/5 27/25 31/23 31/24 | 62/17 63/1 65/12 68/20 69/15 |
|  | 31/25 63/2 65/15 | wouldn't [11] 14/19 21/16 21/16 22/14 55/4 |
|  | whatever [2] 29/5 66/2 when [29] 7/22 12/11 | 56/18 58/15 58/16 60/20 63/2 67/19 wrestling [1] 29/5 |
|  | when [29] $7 / 22$ 12/11 $13 / 113 / 15$ 27/2 27/10 | wrong [2] 44/4 69/8 |
|  | 44/15 48/23 49/7 50/12 51/24 52/2 55/18 | wrote [7] 47/14 54/12 55/3 61/21 62/2 63 |
|  | 59/11 59/11 62/21 66/3 66/24 67 | 63/7 |
|  |  | Y |
| W | 23/5 23/14 23/20 25/10 28/5 28/6 29/23 |  |
|  | 30/21 34/12 34/13 53/24 54/10 61/3 64/4 | 51/4 53/16 61/8 66/16 66/16 |
|  | Where's [1] $52 / 2$ wherever [1] $55 / 2$ |  |
|  | whether [19] 15/6 19/23 25/4 30/9 32/1 | 29/11 29/24 30/17 56/1 56/2 57/11 58/7 |
|  | 32/19 32/20 35/6 35/11 37/14 37/16 39/13 | 62/14 65/3 66/7 |
|  | 41/23 44/1 52/6 52/7 55/7 57/13 59 | yes [15] 7/25 18/17 20/3 23/12 34/8 34/25 |
|  | which [26] 8/1 11/1 11/10 11/12 12/10 16/14 | 45/13 45/14 45/14 50/24 50/24 52/20 54/25 |
|  | 19/24 21/8 21/25 22/9 23/4 23/9 30/9 37/25 | 58/7 71/23 |
|  | 38/3 40/21 41/6 41/7 41/8 44/20 48/22 49/11 | yesterday [1] 58/20 |
|  | 53/7 62/10 70/17 70/18 | yet [2] 38/8 71/17 |
|  | while [5] 37/14 37/15 37/16 37/24 70/5 | York [1] 2/17 |
|  | who [17] 6/22 7/22 17/23 31/18 43/17 45/19 | you [205] |
|  | 47/17 48/2 52/4 54/18 61/5 61/10 62/12 | you'd [2] 29/9 33/4 |
|  | 62/18 65/21 70/11 70/19 | $\left\lvert\, \begin{array}{lll} \text { you'll [1] } & 13 / 2 \\ \text { you're [8] } & 34 / 19 & 39 / \end{array}\right.$ |
|  | whoever [1] 55/ whole [2] 45/21 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { youre 69/24 } \\ & \text { you've [2] } 11 / 1935 / 6 \end{aligned}$ |
|  | wholly [1] 41/3 <br> why [30] 7/24 8/23 1 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { your [124] } \\ & \text { yourselves [1] } 4 / 6 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
|  | $14$ | $\underline{Z}$ |
|  | 46/8 46/12 47/9 52/3 58/18 58/25 59/6 59/18 61/19 71/17 <br> wide [1] 53/10 | ZUCKERMAN [4] 1/21 1/22 4/19 7/2 zuckerman.com [2] 1/24 1/25 |

